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ESSAY
RETHINKING THE LAWS OF GOOD FAITH PURCHASE
Alan Schwartz* and Robert E. Scott**
This Essay is a comparative economic analysis of the disparate doctrines governing the goodfaith purchase of stolen or misappropriatedgoods.
We argue that prior treatments have misconceived the problem. An owner
will take optimal precautions to prevent theft if she is faced with the loss of
her goods; and a purchaser will make an optimal investigation into his
seller's title iffaced with the loss of the goods. An owner and a buyer cannot
both be faced with the full loss, however. This presents a problem of "double
moral hazard" and it cannot be solved in a first-best efficient way. However,
the laws of the major commercial nations are less efficient than they could be.
This is particularly true of current U.S. law: In the United States, an owner
always can recover stolen goods, which reduces her incentive to take optimal
precautions. In turn, a buyer of those goods makes a suboptimal investigation into title because the owner may never find him. We propose that the
owner should be permitted to recover goods only ifshe satisfies a negligence
standardset at the socially optimalprecaution level (which we argueisfeasible). This would increase her incentive to take precautions while retaining
her efficient incentive to search for stolen goods. Since owner search and
buyer investigation are complements, our proposal leaves unchanged the
buyer's incentive to investigate. Also, under current law, an owner who voluntarily parts with her goods cannot recover them from a good faith purchaser. This rule reduces the owner's incentive to search and so reduces the
buyer's incentive to investigate. Thus, we propose that a negligence standard
should apply to owners generally. We argue that the verifiability objections to
a vague standard of negligence can be satisfied by the specification of rulelike proxies for owner negligence. A comparative analysis of the law of good
faith purchase in the leading commercialjurisdictions shows the chaotic nature of the current disparity in treatment of owners and buyers. Since today
many stolen goods cross national borders, a generally applicable solution to
the goodfaith purchase issue willfurther reduce the demandfor stolen goods,
reduce the incidence of strategic litigation, and enhance social welfare.
Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Professor, Yale School of Management.
Alfred McCormack Professor of Law and Director, Center for Contract and
Economic Organization, Columbia University.
We are grateful for comments from Ian Ayres, Clayton Gillette, Henry Hansmann,
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Paul Stephan, and participants at the 2010 American Law and Economics Association
Meeting and at faculty workshops at the Columbia, LUISS, Vanderbilt, Yale, and University
of Texas law schools. Nahale Karimi and Neta Levanon provided valuable research and
translation assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. A Problem in Search of a Solution
In 1945, at the conclusion of the Second World War, a valuable
painting by Claude Monet was stolen from its owner in Germany. By
1956, the painting had appeared on the international art market and was
acquired by a highly respected art dealer in New York. The dealer sold
the painting in 1957 to a good faith purchaser for value. The purchaser
held the painting for over thirty years without facing a claim from the
original owner, although her identity was readily accessible through the
Monet Catalogue Raisonn6, a copy of which was available less than twenty
miles from the original owner's residence. The original owner discovered
the location and identity of the purchaser in 1981 and sued in replevin to
recover the painting.' In DeWeerth v. Baldinger, the Second Circuit found
for the good faith purchaser, despite the well-settled American rule that
neither a thief nor a good faith purchaser from a thief can pass good title
to stolen goods.2 The court held that New York would impose a duty of
reasonable diligence on the owner to learn the identity of the ultimate
purchaser. 3 Several years later, the Guggenheim Museum in New York
brought an action in replevin to recover a stolen Marc Chagall painting
that had been sold to a good faith purchaser by a reputable dealer in
1967. 4 From the time of the theft until the museum fortuitously discovered the painting's location twenty years later, the museum took no steps
to publicize the theft, nor did it inform other museums, galleries, or any
law enforcement authorities. 5 In Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v.
1. The facts are reported in DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 104-06 (2d Cir.
1987). The plaintiff sued within the three-year New York statute of limitations, which runs
from the time the owner demands the good's return and the purchaser refuses. Id. at

106-07.
2. Id. at 107-08. The "theft" rule is an application of the fundamental common law
principle that one cannot convey greater rights in property than one has. It applies to sales
transactions through U.C.C. § 1-103 (2011). The rights of good faith purchasers when the
goods have been voluntarily transferred to a miscreant are embodied in subsections (1)
and (2) of U.C.C. § 2-403. For discussion, see Clayton P. Gillette, Robert E. Scott & Alan
Schwartz, Payment Systems and Credit Instruments 44-45 (2d ed. 2007); Alan Schwartz &
Robert E. Scott, Commercial Transactions: Principles and Policies 491-526 (2d ed. 1991)
[hereinafter Schwartz & Scott, Commercial Transactions].
3. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 110.
4. The trial court granted summary judgment for the purchaser, following the
DeWeerth precedent. The Appellate Division reversed on the ground that, under New York's
demand and refusal rule, no due diligence was imposed on the owner to search for stolen
goods. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 550 N.Y.S.2d 618, 621-22 (App. Div.
1990), aff'd 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991). The New York Appellate Division did recognize
the potential right of the buyer to use the lack of due diligence by the owner to support a
laches defense. Id. at 622. Laches would lie, however, only if "it (was] clear that a plaintiff
unreasonably delayed in initiating an action and a defendant was prejudiced by the delay."
Robins Island Pres. Fund, Inc. v. Southold Dev. Corp., 959 F.2d 409, 423 (2d Cir. 1992).
5. Guggenheim Found., 569 N.E.2d at 428. For an excellent discussion of the case, see
Ashton Hawkins, Richard A. Rothman & David B. Goldstein, A Tale of Two Innocents:
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Lubell, the New York Court of Appeals found for the museum as original
owner, holding, contrary to DeWeerth, that New York's statute of limita6
tions does not require the victim to search diligently for stolen property.
The results in DeWeerth and Lubell illustrate the inconsistency in the
treatment of original owners and good faith buyers in the law of good
faith purchase. This disparity in treatment is even more evident when
comparing results between jurisdictions that apply a "theft" rule, under
which an owner who sues in a timely manner always recovers stolen
goods, 7 and those that apply the doctrine of "Market Overt." Under
Market Overt, good faith purchasers from a merchant-dealer prevail over
owners of stolen goods, notwithstanding an owner's diligent efforts to
8
prevent the theft and to recover the goods once the theft has occurred.
This disparity in the legal treatment of stolen and misappropriated goods
impedes international efforts to solve a significant economic problem:
The annual national and international trade in stolen and misappropriated goods is in the billions of dollars. 9
There are several reasons why good faith purchase law is a troubled
legal area. To begin with, scholars have not reached consensus on a solution to the good faith purchase problem; that is, they have not agreed on
just when the owners of stolen or misappropriated goods should recover
them and when they should not.10 The literature has identified many of
the considerations that should influence a solution, but has yet to aggregate these considerations into a coherent policy response. The fragmentation among scholars mirrors a similar fragmentation among lawmakers.
Good faith purchase rules have been around for a long time-they apCreating an Equitable Balance Between the Rights of Former Owners and Good Faith
Purchasers of Stolen Art, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 49, 55-69 (1995).
6. 569 N.E.2d at 428-29.
7. The owner's right to recover stolen goods in jurisdictions, such as the United
States, that follow the theft rule is contingent on the owner bringing suit within the statute
of limitations for an action in replevin. See infra text accompanying notes 17-20 for
discussion of the wide variety in limitation periods.
8. See infra note 16.
9. Art theft is the third most profitable worldwide crime behind drug smuggling and
illegal arms trading. William Tuohy, Picture This: Art Thievery Is Thriving, L.A. Times,
Aug. 16, 1994, at Hi. The market for stolen artwork and looted artifacts reaches an
estimated two billion dollars annually. David Holmstrom, Stolen-Art Market Is a Big
Business at $2 Billion a Year, Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 11, 1994, at 1.
10. Compare Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Sales Law and the Contracting Process
508-12 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter Schwartz & Scott, Sales Law] (criticizing American theft
rule on efficiency grounds), Menachem Mautner, "The Eternal Triangles of the Law":
Toward a Theory of Priorities in Conflicts Involving Remote Parties, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 95,
151-52 (1991) (same), and Barak Medina, Augmenting the Value of Ownership by
Protecting It Only Partially: The "Market-Overt" Rule Revisited, 19 J.L. Econ. & Org. 343
(2003) (arguing for relative efficiency of "Market-Overt" rule in protecting rights of good
faith purchasers of stolen goods), with Harold R. Weinberg, Sales Law, Economics, and the
Negotiability of Goods, 9 J. Legal Stud. 569 (1980) (arguing for efficiency of American
"theft rule" protecting rights of original owners of stolen goods in contests with good faith
purchasers).

2011]

RETHINKING THE LAWS OF GOOD FAITH PURCHASE

1335

pear in the Code of Hammurabi-and the rules are part of every advanced state's commercial law, but to this day the laws themselves differ
widely."
Uniformity across legal systems does exist, but only at the level of first
principles. Common law and civil code systems all begin with the fundamental principle that, ordinarily, one cannot convey greater rights than
one has-a principle embodied in the Latin maxim nemo dat quod non
habet.12 The variation across legal systems arises because countries create
significantly different exceptions to the nemo dat principle. Under the law
of good faith purchase as it is embodied in the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.), the nemo dat rule is subject to only two exceptions. First,
under the "voidable title" rule, if the original owner is induced-say, by
fraud or deceit-to transfer goods under a transaction of purchase, the
transferee acquires the power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value. 13 Second, under the "entrustment" rule, if the original
owner entrusts goods to a merchant who deals in goods of the kind, the
merchant has the power to transfer the owner's title to a buyer in the
ordinary course of business. 14 But, as noted above, in many other legal
systems an innocent buyer can acquire rights in yet a third contextwhere stolen goods are transferred to a merchant dealer who, in turn,
sells the goods to a bona fide purchaser for value.' 5 The buyer, if in
11. We review the laws of leading jurisdictions in Part V.
12. See infra Appendix (canvassing good faith purchase laws of several countries,
each of which adopts nemo dat principle).

13. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (2011) provides:
A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith
purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under a transaction of
purchase the purchaser has such power even though (a) the transferor was
deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or (b) the delivery was in exchange
for a check which is later dishonored, or (c) it was agreed that the transaction was
to be a "cash sale", or (d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as
larcenous under the criminal law.
14. U.C.C. § 2-403(2) provides: "Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant
that deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a
buyer in ordinary course of business." U.C.C. § 1-201 (9) defines "buyer in ordinary course
of business" as "a person that buys in good faith, without knowledge that the sale violates
the rights of another person in the goods, and in the ordinary course from a person, other
than a pawnbroker, in the business of selling goods of that kind."
15. Jurisdictions that have some version of the Market Overt rule include Brazil,
Canada (Quebec), China, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, and Spain. See,
e.g., C6digo Civil [C.C.] art. 1268 (Braz.) (Leslie Rose trans., Renovar 2008); Civil Code of
Quebec [C.C.Q.] arts. 1713-14 (Can.) (Jean-Maurice Brisson & Nicholas Kasirer trans.,
tditions Yvon Blais 2002); Xianxing Fagui Huibian [Property Law] art. 107 (China) (trans.
on file with the Columbia Law Review); Code civil [C. civ.] art. 2277 (Fr.) (John H. Crabb
trans., Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1995); Bfirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] § 935
(Ger.) (Langenscheidt Translation Serv. trans., Fed. Ministry of Justice 2010); Sale Law,
5728-1968, § 34 (Isr.), translated in 1 Business Laws of Israel 1.5-79, 1.5-85 (Louis Garb et
al. eds. & trans., 2006); Codice civile [C.c.] art. 1153 (It.) (Mario Beltramo et al. trans.,
Oceana 2010); Minp6 [Minp6] [Civ. C.] art. 194 (Japan) (Ministry ofJustice trans., 2009);
C6digo Civil Federal [CC] art. 799 (Mex.) (Julio Romanach, Jr. trans., Lawrence Publ'g
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good faith, prevails against the original owner under the Market Overt
6
rule.1
The diversity in the rules specifying the substantive rights of the parties is mirrored by a similar diversity in the procedural rules governing
the timing of actions by original owners against subsequent purchasers.
Indeed, much of the action in good faith purchase contests, as measured
by the volume of litigation, turns on statute of limitations questions.
Here, there is diversity among U.S. jurisdictions as well as internationally.
There are currently three general rules used to determine when the statute of limitations begins to run. At one extreme in protecting the original
owner's rights is the "demand and refusal" rule, under which the statute
of limitations for a suit in replevin begins to run only when the owner
17
finds her goods and demands their return, and the buyer refuses her.
Co. 2002); C6digo Civil [C.C.] art. 464 (Spain) (Julio Romanach, Jr. trans., Lawrence
Publ'g Co. 1994); see also sources cited infra in Appendix. The rule traces its lineage to the
Code of Hammurabi, the Ordinances of Manu (India), early Saxon law, and early Hebraic
laws. Daniel E. Murray, Sale in Market Overt, 9 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 24, 29-32 (1960).
16. In order to qualify as a Market Overt, the merchant-dealer must display the goods
openly for sale. In the true Market Overt, the good faith buyer who purchases in a
qualifying market gets good title to the purchased goods. See, e.g., Sale of Goods Act, 1979,
c. 54, § 22, (Eng.); C. civ. art. 2277 (Fr.); BGB § 935 (Ger.); Sale Law, 5728-1968, § 34
(Isr.), translated in 1 Business Laws of Israel, supra note 15, at 1.5-79, 1.5-85; C.c. art. 1153
(It.). In many civil law jurisdictions, as well as in regimes ranging from early India to Japan,
the original owner is entitled to the return of his goods, but only if he pays the buyer the
purchase price the buyer paid to acquire them. See, e.g., Property Law art. 107 (China); C.
civ. art. 2277 (Fr.); Civ. C. art. 194 (Japan); CC art. 799 (Mex.); C.C. art. 464 (Spain). We
criticize this version of the theft rule at infra text accompanying notes 133-135. A number
of jurisdictions-Canada, England today, India, and Russia-reject the Market Overt rule
and follow the American rule allowing the original owner to recover stolen goods from the
good faith purchaser. See infra Appendix. The American rejection of the Market Overt
rule evolved as an artifact of the revolutionary period and path dependence largely
explains why it remains to this day. Early U.S. courts declined to import the English rule of
Market Overt in the period just after the Constitution was ratified because, as Chancellor
Kent stated in an early New York case, "[There is] no usage or regulation within this state,
no Saxon institution of markets-overt, which controls or interferes with the application of the
common law." Wheelwright v. Depeyster, 1 Johns. 471, 480 (N.Y. 1806). The common law
rule in England permitted the good faith buyer to prevail over the original owner if he
bought in any "open" market (that is, a market where the goods were openly displayed to
customers) in the City of London or in any of the country fairs that were regularly held.
Peter M. Smith, Valediction to Market Overt, 41 Am. J. Legal Hist. 225, 226-30, 242-44
(1997). The English rule continued unchanged for several hundred years until repealed by
statute in 1994. Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act, 1994, c. 32, § 1 (Eng.). The repeal was
not prompted by a principled preference for vindicating the original owner's rights, but
because the British courts apparently encountered line-drawing problems. Smith, supra, at
248-49.
17. Under New York law, the statute of limitations for a suit in replevin is three years.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(3) (McKinney 1990). The demand and refusal rule, under which the
statute of limitations is not triggered until a demand is made and return refused, was
adopted by the New York Court of Appeals in Gillet v. Roberts, 57 N.Y. 28, 30 (1874). See
also Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 809 (Sup. Ct. 1966) ("[T]he cause of action against a
person who lawfully comes by a chattel arises, not upon the stealing or the taking, but
upon the defendant's refusal to convey the chattel upon demand."). The rule has been
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At the other extreme are limitation periods that run either from the time
of the theft18 or the time of purchase by the merchant-seller so long as
the buyer can establish an open, notorious, and continuous adverse possession.1 9 Finally, a number ofjurisdictions have adopted an intermediate
"discovery" rule under which the statute of limitations begins to run when
the original owner discovers or should have discovered the location of her
20
stolen goods.
The lack of harmony in good faith purchase laws, combined with the
multibillion dollar market in stolen goods, creates costly and unnecessary
domestic and international litigation. Over the last two decades, there has
been a dramatic increase in contests between original owners and good
faith purchasers. 21 The cases raise complex conflict of laws issues. In
many of the cases, the resolution of the contest turns on the question of
which jurisdiction's law determines the parties' rights. 2 2 Thus, when the
location of the goods and/or the domicile of the claimants are in different
states or nations, the multijurisdictional character of the dispute substantially complicates the ownership issues. The choice of law determination
may support the policy choices of a particular jurisdiction, but from a

justified on the grounds that it protects the purchaser who, as a result of the rule, is not
liable in conversion until a demand is made. Andrea E. Hayworth, Note, Stolen Artwork:
Deciding Ownership Is No Pretty Picture, 43 Duke LJ. 337, 361 (1993) ("This requirement
makes the innocent purchaser aware that a claim against the property is pending and
offers an opportunity to return the property before being treated as a wrongdoer."). At
least one foreign jurisdiction has adopted a similar statute of limitations. See Obtansk,
zdkonik [Civil Code) E. 102, 134/2001 Sb. (Czech) (Trade Links trans., 2002) (stipulating
owner can assert property right against good faith purchaser for three years from when
said right was asserted to good faith purchaser).
18. See, e.g., C. civ. art. 2276 (Fr.); Civ. C. art. 193 (Japan); Code Civil [CC] arts. 722,
728 (Switz.) (Rebecca Brunner-Peters et al. trans., Schulthess 2007).
19. See, e.g., S.F. Credit Clearing House v. Wells, 239 P. 319, 321 (Cal. 1925) (finding
possession lacked continuity and openness, thereby precluding operation of adverse
possession); Reynolds v. Bagwell, 198 P.2d 215, 216 (Okla. 1948) ("The statute of
limitations as to personal property, though stolen, when held in good faith for value, open
and notoriously, runs in favor of such adverse possession so as to bar a recovery by the true
owner after the expiration of [the statutory period]." (quoting Shelby v. Sharner, 115 P.
785, 785 (Okla. 1911))). The adverse possession rule suffers from a verifiability problem:
Proving open and notorious possession of personal property is more problematic than it is
in the case of real property. For discussion of the adverse possession rule, see infra notes
104-105 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg &
Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1391 (S.D. Ind. 1989) ("[T]he plaintiffs' cause
of action did not accrue until they knew or were reasonably on notice of the identity of the
possessor of the [stolen goods]."); O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 870 (N.J. 1980)
(adopting discovery rule for action in replevin); see also Property Law art. 107 (China);
Grazhdanskii Kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii [GK RF] [Civil Code] arts. 196, 200, & 234
(Russ.) (William E. Butler trans., Wildy, Simmonds & Hill Publ'g 2010).
21. For examples of recent cases see infra notes 103, 139, 146.
22. See cases cited infra notes 141-146.
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social welfare perspective much of the litigation is socially wasteful and
the law, as described by some commentators, is "chaotic." 23
B. Our Solution in Brief
In this Essay, we develop a novel treatment of the good faith
purchase problem. This treatment has three purposes: (1) to explain why
the problem has been so hard to solve; (2) to propose a solution that
responds to the real difficulties that courts face in deciding these contests; and (3) to show how various countries' laws can be harmonized to
increase efficiency and reduce transaction costs.
To see why the problem is so intractable, recall first that there are at
least four parties to any good faith purchase dispute: the original owner,
the thief,24 the ultimate purchaser, and the seller to the ultimate purchaser, who is often a merchant. We focus here on the original owner
(0) and the ultimate purchaser (B) for two reasons. First, the thief is
commonly judgment-proof and seldom can be found. Second, the
merchant is effectively a buyer. If the original owner prevails against the
25
ultimate purchaser, the purchaser sues his seller on a title warranty; if
the original owner loses to the ultimate purchaser, the owner can sue the
seller in conversion. 26 As a consequence, the seller to the ultimate purchaser is a buyer, in the sense that he must lose the goods' value to someone if he purchased a bad title. 27 Little generality is lost, therefore, by
restricting the analysis to the behavior of the original owner and the ultimate purchaser.
Even so, there is no agreement regarding which legally induced incentives are appropriate for these parties. This is because the good faith
23. For an excellent discussion of the "chaos" that results from the interaction of
disparate good faith purchase laws and neutral choice of law rules, see Patricia Youngblood
Reyhan, A Chaotic Palette: Conflict of Laws in Litigation Between Original Owners and
Good-Faith Purchasers of Stolen Art, 50 Duke L.J. 955 (2001).
24. A "thief" is either the person who actually steals goods, or is a voluntary transferee
who wrongfully misappropriates the goods and sells them to a third party. As an example
of this latter case, the transferee/thief acquires the goods in return for a check or a
promise to pay cash later. Subsequently, the check is dishonored or the cash is not paid,
and the thief sells the goods to a third party.
25. U.C.C. § 2-312 (2011). If sellers in the relevant trade disclaim this warranty, the
demand curve will reflect the risk that buyers bear, so a seller cannot entirely escape the
consequences of selling untitled goods.
26. Under property law principles, the original owner can maintain an action in
conversion against any person, even an innocent third party, who takes possession of her
goods without her permission. Carey v. Cyr, 113 A.2d 614, 616 (Me. 1955). Much prior
analysis overlooks the possibility that owners can sue dealers for conversion. A notable
exception is Hanoch Dagan, Takanat Ha-Sahuk Bituakh [The Market Overt as Insurance],
in Mekhkarey Mishpat Likhvodo Shel Yehoshua Weisman [Essays in Honor of Joshua
Weisman] 15-42 (S. Lerner & D. Lewinsohn-Zamir eds., 2002) (trans. on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
27. We argue below, however, that dealer/buyers should face higher damages than
ultimate purchasers. See infra text accompanying notes 72-77.
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purchase problem cannot be solved efficiently with the legal strategies
that commercial law provides. Commercial law does not directly create
incentives for parties to take particular actions, or refrain from those actions. Rather, the law allocates property rights among the relevant agents.
The opportunity to protect or to acquire property rights creates whatever
incentives commercial law provides, and those incentives are inadequate
in the good faith purchase context.
Ideally, the owner, 0, should invest in precaution until the marginal
reduction in the probability of an involuntary transfer 28 times the goods'
value to her equals the marginal precaution cost. However, the incentive
to protect against loss is reduced to the extent that losses can be undone.
0 thus chooses a suboptimal precaution level when she is legally entitled
to recover lost goods. Different suboptimal incentives drive the buyer's
behavior. The buyer, B, should invest in ensuring that his title is good
until the marginal increase in the probability of receiving a good title
times the goods' value to him equals the marginal inquiry cost. Buyers
choose a lower inquiry level than this because (1) owners may not find
goods that they are legally entitled to recover; and (2) buyers sometimes
can keep goods that they purchase in good faith.
To illustrate the problem that these incentive weaknesses create, consider the American theft rule. As just noted, in order to give 0 efficient
incentives to prevent theft, the right of 0 to recover stolen goods should
be completely cut off. On the other hand, to give B efficient incentives to
purchase only a clear title, 0 should always be permitted to recover stolen
goods. The theft rule creates suboptimal incentives for the owner because
she can always recover the goods, but the rule creates efficient incentives
for the buyer, who always loses. Reversing the parties' rights would improve the owner's incentives but at the cost of worsening the buyer's incentives. As is apparent, commercial law's property-right allocations can29
not create optimal incentives for both 0 and B in the theft context.
Efficiency is therefore unattainable in the good faith purchase context
when the law is restricted to allocating property rights. Scholars have not
solved the good faith purchase problem because their inquiries have
largely been conducted within the commercial law paradigm, and no optimal solution can be found there.
A further difficulty with solving the good faith purchase problem
under commercial law is that the law creates two legal obligations that
apply to the same goods, thereby complicating the ultimate buyer's max28. We define an "involuntary transfer" as the theft of goods from 0, or a voluntary
transfer from 0 after which the transferee sells the goods to another without O's
authorization. See supra note 24.
29. In economics, difficulties of this kind are referred to as "double moral hazard"
problems. For discussion of the problem of double moral hazard in the tort law context,
see Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 203-04 (2004) [hereinafter
Shavell, Foundations] (explaining why neither negligence nor strict liability regimes
induce parties to take optimal level of care).
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imization problem. American law is illustrative of this point, although it
also arises under the laws of those foreign jurisdictions that have a version
of the theft rule. 30 Recall that the ultimate buyer loses if the property was
originally stolen, which creates an incentive for the buyer to inquire into
the probability of theft. In contrast, the buyer can keep the goods if they
had been delivered under a transaction of purchase or entrusted to a
merchant and subsequently misappropriated, unless the buyer purchased
them in bad faith. As we show below, it is less costly for a buyer to establish his good faith than it is for him to inquire optimally into the possibility of theft. 31 Thus, the voidable title and entrustment rules induce buyers
to choose a lower precaution level than the level that the theft rule induces. When the buyer makes a purchase decision, however, he does not
know whether the goods had been stolen, delivered, or entrusted. Therefore he does not know which legal duty he must satisfy, and thus how
32
much he should invest in precaution.
The considerations set out here suggest that the solution to the incentive problems in the good faith purchase context must be found elsewhere than commercial law. In this Essay, we contend that the optimal
solution would be to abandon commercial law for tort-tort solutions are
regulatory; they directly hold agents to exogenously set standards. Applied here, a "tort type" solution would permit 0 to recover involuntarily
transferred goods unless she was negligent in protecting them. If she was
negligent, then the buyer, B, can keep the goods. 33 An owner who anticipates being unable to recover the goods if she is negligent will take optimal precautions. And since a negligence rule permits nonnegligent owners to recover stolen goods, the rule retains the owner's incentive to
search optimally for them. This proposed negligence rule would make
buyers strictly liable because they would always lose to nonnegligent owners. Repealing rules that protect buyers who purchase in good faith would
also raise the inquiry level that buyers would choose. Thus, a modified
tort solution would improve on the commercial law of good faith
purchase but for the difficulty of implementing a negligence rule.
Implementation is a significant concern because the efficient negligence standard for protecting goods would require 0 to choose the pre30. Most jurisdictions that have adopted the theft rule also have the voidable title and
entrustment rules as well, thus creating the dilemma for the buyer that is described in the
text. See infra Appendix.
31. See infra notes 60-62, 67 and accompanying text.
32. Canada (Ontario), England, and India also apply two rules to the same goods. See
infra Appendix. In these jurisdictions, the buyer wins if the goods were stolen but the
owner's conduct was such as to estop her from asserting her title. The owner wins,
however, if she was merely negligent. When an ultimate buyer purchases, he does not know
how the original owner behaved.
33. In Part III.C, we discuss the cases that a negligence solution does not resolve:
when 0 and B both are negligent or when neither is negligent. We argue there that owners
should prevail when neither is negligent and buyers should prevail when both are
negligent.
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caution level that 0 would have chosen if she were optimizing against the
goods' full value to her. It can be difficult for a court to know what that
level is. The goods' true value when stolen and when recovered, and the
precaution level that 0 actually chose, may not be verifiable to a court.
Further, to set the negligence standard, a court would have to know the
precaution choice the owner should have made given her costs, her valuation for the goods, and the available technology. These factors are difficult for courts to reconstruct.
Despite these difficulties, commercial law's inescapable limitations
motivate us to propose a variant of the typical negligence solution. Our
proposal instructs courts to use various verifiable proxies for an owner's
negligence. 34 In the United States, these proxies can be adopted as part
of a statutory revision to the U.C.C. 35 Indeed, the U.C.C. now uses a negligence solution, together with proxies for negligence, to resolve property
right contests between owners and purchasers of misappropriated commercial paper. 36 In the same vein, we propose, as examples, that 0
should be presumed negligent if she fails to take customary precautions, 37 fails to increase the odds of recovery by tagging or marking goods
when these identification tactics exist, or fails to make timely search for
involuntarily transferred goods. 38 These proxies correlate with a lack of
due care by the owner, and courts could apply them, so our modified
negligence solution seems both promising and workable.
We conclude this Introduction with two comments. First, this proposed solution is incomplete because it does not respond to the underenforcement concern that the good faith purchase problem raises. The
concern in tort is that substantial subsets of victims do not sue. Hence, an
appropriately set negligence standard actually functions suboptimally. 39
The analogue in the good faith purchase context is the inability of every
owner to find stolen or misappropriated goods. A buyer who is strictly
liable for buying such goods would nevertheless take suboptimal care because he optimizes against the goods' actual value discounted by the
34. As we show infra in text accompanying notes 107-109, there is no need for courts
to evaluate buyer behavior. Under our proposed reform, the buyer always loses to the
owner who takes efficient precautions and always prevails over an owner who does not.
35. Negligence proxies can also be implemented as revisions to the statutes and civil
codes that govern good faith purchase contests in other commercial jurisdictions. See infra
Appendix.
36. U.C.C. §§ 3-404 to 406 (2011); see also infra text accompanying notes 90-94.
37. An example of a customary standard is the installation of a burglar alarm. We
discuss these proxies infra in Part III.B.
38. Failure to make reasonable search efforts would include a failure to make a
reasonable investigation of a voluntary transferee. This obligation is necessary when 0
would lose to a good faith purchaser and thus, we show, would search suboptimally.
39. Shavell, Foundations, supra note 29, at 285-87. A negligence standard in tort
functions suboptimally because the expected liability of a potential injurer is not the
damage he causes times the probability of harm, but rather the damages of litigious victims
times the probability of their harm. The potential injurer takes suboptimal care because
his expected liability is less than the actual harm he causes.
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probability that the owner finds him. We propose a variant of the tort
fine as a solution to the underenforcement concern: A bad faith dealer
40
should be required to pay a nondisclaimable civil fine to the state. Second, the analysis thus far assumes that the social preference should be for
commercial law rules to induce privately optimal owner and buyer precautions against theft. This assumption may be controversial because the
state also protects property with the criminal justice system. To support
our assumption, we argue below that the appropriate division of labor
between private and public law requires private law to attempt to induce
the level of property protection that maximizes the private agents'
utility.

41

This Essay proceeds as follows: Part II sets out a model of the good
faith purchase problem, showing that both the American theft rule and
the voidable title rule (and its variants, the entrustment and Market Overt
rules) reduce social welfare. Part III presents a reform proposal that encourages more efficient precautions by both parties while responding to
the verifiability problems that otherwise render tort-type solutions impractical. Part IV defends this Essay's proposal against certain noninstrumental objections. Part V evaluates the good faith purchase laws of the
leading commercial jurisdictions with two goals in mind: to describe the
costs of the current diversity of solutions to the good faith purchase problem, and to argue that our solution improves on the current approaches.
Part VI briefly concludes.
II. A

MODEL OF THE GOOD FAITH PURCHASE PROBLEM

A. Social and Private Optimality
The criminal law and the law of good faith purchase both affect the
precaution levels that sellers and buyers choose to protect their property.
Such joint regulation raises an issue: How can two applicable regulatory
systems be made to cohere? We argue here that coherence is best obtained in the good faith purchase context when the private law rules induce agents to choose privately optimal protection levels. The argument
has three parts. First, society should invest a positive sum to protect private property. Second, private agents will attempt to protect their own
property even when public policing is effective. Third, a private agent
best advances the social goal of property protection when she chooses the
protection level that maximizes the value of her own property. Since commercial law rules significantly influence the actions private agents take, it
follows that those rules should attempt to induce privately optimal
behavior.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 76-77. Alternatives to tort fines include
punitive damages or subsidizing litigation (by awarding attorneys' fees to successful
plaintiffs). Tort fines are discussed in Shavell, Foundations, supra note 29, at 272-75.
41. See infra Part II.A.
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To begin, society protects an owner's property rights, on the economic view, for two reasons. First, in a decentralized economic system,
wealth is maximized when owners invest in increasing the value of their
own property. The productivity of owner investment falls as the
probability of theft increases. Put more simply, owners are less likely to
invest if they cannot keep what they produce. 42 Second, a buyer who
purchases goods always values them more highly in expectation than the
owner does. A thief, however, may or may not have a higher valuation.
Hence, the probability that goods will move to a higher valued user is
43
necessarily lower when goods are stolen than when they are traded.
Both reasons imply that the social level of investment in property protection is positive. The question is how this investment should be allocated
44
as between public and private actors.
The answer to this question should turn on the extent of overlap
between public and private goals. We claim that those goals are largely
congruent. Initially, note that private agents will invest positive amounts
in property protection independently of the level that the criminal justice
system induces. A city police force, for example, may be especially effective at recovering stolen cars, but many owners will nonetheless lock
doors, take keys, and park in safe areas. Thus, the relevant policy question
is what society should want private agents to do, not whether society
should enlist agents in the theft reduction task.
Private agents internalize many of the social benefits that protecting
property attempts to maximize and internalize many of the costs that protecting property attempts to minimize. The benefits are the increased
productivity from investment that security in property induces and the
increased utility (on average) that owners derive from possessing their
own goods relative to the utility that strangers would derive from those
goods. Owners also naturally bear many of the costs associated with protecting their property, such as buying locks for doors. Consequently,
there would be no conflict between individual and collective rationality if
agents were to take privately efficient precautions against theft. The benefits that owners would optimally invest to protect-investment gain and
42. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 31-33 (7th ed. 2007). But see Frank
I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in Nomos XXIV: Ethics,
Economics, and the Law 3, 25 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982).
43. Posner, supra note 42, at 205. A more extensive discussion of this point is in
Richard L. Hasen & Richard H. McAdams, The Surprisingly Complex Case Against Theft,
17 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 367, 370-74 (1997). These authors argue that when a theft is for
resale, which a large number are, the thief values the goods for their "exchange value":
The price the thief can get for the goods in the market place. The owner values the goods
in excess of their exchange value, else the owner would already have sold the goods. Thus,
in the usual case the owner has a higher valuation than the thief.
44. We note here that the domain of this Essay is tangible goods; we do not consider
the stealing or "appropriation" of the creative goods that are the subject of the patent and
copyright laws. In those domains, the case against theft is more nuanced and complex. For
discussion, see Jonathan M. Barnett, What's So Bad About Stealing?, 4 J. Tort L., no. 1,
2011 at 1, 7-11, 13-17.
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utility from goods-are the social benefits as well. The concern, therefore, is not that privately optimizing agents would invest too much in pro45
tecting their property; rather, it is that they might not invest enough.
When choosing a precaution level, an individual owner likely ignores positive externalities from theft prevention, such as the more extensive participation of citizens in the public life of cities when the crime level is low.
It follows that society should encourage agents to take privately optimal
precautions, and then society should implement the level of public enforcement that permits it to realize the gains that private agents ignore.
This conclusion is strengthened by the realization that private agents
are better informed than public agents about the choices that determine
the level of precautions that are taken. No social planner could quantify
the benefits that an owner would derive from property ownership, nor
could the planner sum those benefits across persons. Similarly, identifying an effective precaution often requires "local knowledge." For example, a factory owner likely knows best how to protect her valuable machines. Private agents thus not only largely share society's property
protection goals; they also have a comparative advantage at realizing
them.
B. A Model of Precaution
In the model set out in this Part, we assume that society moves first to
choose both the level of policing and a set of private law rules. Private
agents then make the precaution choices that the rules induce. Since society prefers those choices to be privately optimal, 4 6 society should
choose privately efficient rules. The model shows how the current rules
fall short.
The two risk-neutral agents in our model who move second-the
original owner and the ultimate buyer-choose their own precaution
level (the owner) and inquiry level (the buyer), taking as given the level
of policing and the legal rules in place. The model's timing is as follows:
Precaution

St

Theft?
1

Search?
t

2

Find?
t3

The owner chooses a precaution level, denoted c, to protect the
value the goods have for her, which we denote v(t°). The probability that
owner precautions prevent theft is p(c). A victimized owner searches for
her goods, denoted "found goods," when their expected value exceeds
search costs. The value of the goods themselves is denoted v(t 3) because
45. An owner may be thought to overinvest in protection if she chooses a pathological
precaution, such as installing a spring gun on her property. The law specifically deters such
behaviors. See, e.g., Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657, 660-61 (Iowa 1971) (collecting cases
finding liability when property owners injure tresspassers with spring guns).
46. See infra Part II.C.3.
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the owner cannot find goods until time t3 . The value of found goods to
the owner has two elements. First, if the law permits the owner of stolen
goods to recover them, and if the owner values the goods more highly
than the ultimate buyer does, the owner repossesses the goods. Second, if
the buyer values the goods more highly than the owner does, the buyer
purchases the right to keep them. Hence, the value of found goods to the
owner, denoted vr, is the sum of (1) the expected value of the goods
when the owner has the higher valuation, and (2) the expected value of
the price the buyer must pay to keep them when he has the higher valuation. The cost of owner search is denoted z and the probability that
assume that some level of
search uncovers the goods is x(z).47 We initially
48
precaution and of search is productive.
The buyer can investigate to learn whether his seller has a good title
to convey. From the buyer's viewpoint, the probability that the seller can
convey a good title is exogenous. The buyer has an initial estimate of this
probability and can refine his estimate-inquire into title-at cost w. The
buyer's refined belief that he would be purchasing a good title is denoted
g(w). Thus the buyer's subjective probability that he can keep what he
buys is the probability that he assigns to having a good title plus the
probability he assigns to having a bad title times the probability that the
owner never finds him. We write this joint probability as g(w) +
(1-g(w)) (1-x(z)). 49 If the law instead permitted a buyer to keep goods
that he purchased in good faith, then the buyer would believe that he can
retain the goods with probability g(w'), where w' is the cost of proving
good faith to a court, not the cost of an optimal inquiry into whether the
buyer's vendor has a good title to convey. In the United States, these costs
differ (w # w'). The buyer values the goods at vb.
47. Formally, the value of found goods is:
Vr

= (I -p(c))x(z){

-Fvb)v(t')+ F(vb)a ((vb)-v(t3))dvb

The term outside the braces is the probability that the goods are stolen times the
probability that they are found. The first term in braces is the expected value of the goods
if the owner repossesses them; the second term is the expected value of the price the buyer
pays to keep them (when his value is higher). The a before the integral indexes the
owner's bargaining power (0 < a < 1).
48. Technically, we assume that the marginal benefit of precaution and search is
positive, starting at the zero level; that precaution and search costs are convex; and that it is
suboptimal to protect or search infinitely. The assumption that the optimal level of
precaution exceeds zero is explained below. See infra note 53. The assumption that the
owner always searches is relaxed below. There seems no reason to believe, as a general
3
matter, that v(tO) is higher or lower than v(t ). Some goods may fall in value due to later
use or abuse. Other goods, such as art and jewelry, may increase in value. As a practical
matter, owners only search for valuable goods, so the conflicts the law must resolve, and
thus the domain of our analysis, concern valuable goods.
49. Recall that the probability that the owner finds stolen goods is x(z), so the
probability that the goods remain hidden is 1-x(z).

1346

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 111:1332

The owner's incentive to invest in theft prevention and the buyer's
investment in getting good title are (weak) substitutes: The more the
owner invests in precaution, the smaller the pool of stolen goods in commerce, and the lower the buyer's optimal inquiry level. Similarly, the
more the buyer invests in checking tide, the more difficult it is for thieves
to sell stolen goods, thereby lowering the owner's optimal level of precaution. On the other hand, the owner's incentive to search once goods are
stolen and the buyer's incentive to ensure good tide are complements:
Search increases the probability that stolen goods are found, so buyer
investments in ensuring good tide become more productive as owner
50
search increases.
C. FirstBest and the 'Double Moral Hazard"Problem
As argued above, society prefers an owner to choose the precaution
level that efficiently protects her own property. She thus should maximize
the following expression:
Maxcp (c) v(te) -c
The solution is:
(1) p'(c)v(t0 )

=

1

The owner should invest in precaution until the expected marginal
increase in her return from preventing theft-the left-hand side of Expression (1)-equals the marginal cost of protection-the right-hand
side of Expression (1). We denote this privately and publically optimal
level of care variable c*.
The reasons that should lead society to prefer having the owner optimize against the goods' value to her also imply that the buyer should
optimize against the goods' value to him when he inquires into his seller's
50. Our model is similar to the model in William Landes & Richard A. Posner, The
Economics of Legal Disputes over the Ownership of Works of Art and Other Collectibles,
in Economics of the Arts: Selected Essays 177, 185 (V.A. Ginsburgh & P.M. Menger eds.,
1996). Landes and Posner's excellent analysis of the art market omits dealers, and assumes
that the owner can recover stolen art with certainty, that the owner and the buyer place the
same value on stolen goods, that the buyer attempts to conceal his possession, and that
parties function under some legal uncertainty. These assumptions are plausible for the art
market but not generally, so we do not make them. For example, the buyer of a stolen
Matisse may display it in a locked room, but the buyer of a stolen machine must openly use
it. Also, because Landes and Posner focus on the art market, they do not derive generally
applicable legal reforms nor do they make a comparative law analysis. A thoughtful paper
by Omri Ben-Shahar also considers the incentives of owners and buyers. Omri Ben-Shahar,
Property Rights in Stolen Goods: An Economic Analysis (Univ. of Mich., John M. Olin Ctr.
for Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 99-15, 1999). Ben-Shahar stays largely within the
property rights paradigm and omits dealers but he helpfully integrates the thief's
incentives into the owner's problem. Doing this here would not change our policy
proposals. Ben-Shahar also does not consider how courts could apply a negligence
solution, nor does he make a comparative analysis.
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title. Assume then that (1) the law permits 0 always to recover stolen
goods and (2) 0 always finds them. The buyer's problem, on the two
assumptions, is to choose the investigation level that maximizes the following expression:
Maxwg (w)vb-w
The solution is:
(2) g'(w)vb

=

1

The buyer invests in inquiry until the expected marginal increase in
the value to him of retaining goods-the left-hand side of Expression
(2)-equals the marginal cost of investigation-the right-hand side of
(2). This level of inquiry, denoted w*, equals the level of care that society
prefers. Therefore, the law should permit 0 always to recover stolen or
51
misappropriated goods in order to ensure that B invests w*.
Social welfare is always below first best in any commercial law regime
for two reasons. First, the law cannot permit 0 always and never to recover stolen goods; nor can B be permitted always and never to keep
stolen goods. This is a variant of the double moral hazard problem.
There is no first best solution to problems of this kind. Second, because
the law cannot ensure that 0 always finds stolen goods, B necessarily
behaves suboptimally: The probability he assigns to retaining stolen
goods is not g(w)-his updated belief that the goods were not stolenbut this belief plus the probability that his title is defective but the owner
does not find him.
D. Parties'Behavior Under American Law
1. The Theft Rule.
a. The Owner's Problem. - We initially assume that the owner can recover stolen goods from a good faith purchaser. Under this rule, the
owner's problem has two components: to reduce the probability of theft
and to locate stolen goods. To solve this problem, we begin at the last
stage, after goods have been stolen. The owner's payoff from searching
for the goods is the expected value of recovery (the probability of finding
51. The representation of the buyer's problem above is oversimplified. The buyer
actually faces what is called an optimal stopping problem. He should incur inquiry costs in
checking title until it is optimal for him to stop, which is when the probability that the
seller's tide is good is sufficiently high to make further inquiries not worth their cost, or
when the probability that the seller's tile is bad is sufficiently high to make further inquiry
not cost-justified. The mathematical representation of optimal stopping problems is
complex. The complexity is unnecessary for our purposes. In an optimal stopping model,
the buyer will stop searching too soon because he discounts the productivity of search by
the likelihood that the owner will not find him. The text represents the buyer's problem as
choosing a level of inquiry into title because this yields the same result in a more intuitively
obvious way.
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the goods times their then-value to her) less search costs. The owner
chooses the level of search that maximizes this payoff:
Maxzx(z)vr-z
The solution to this problem is:
(3) x'(z)vr = 1

The owner invests in the search for stolen goods until the expected
marginal increase in the return from locating them-the left-hand side of
Expression (3)-equals the marginal cost of search-the right-hand side
of (3). This is the first best search level, which we denote z*. 0 searches
efficiently because, under the assumed rule, she can recover any goods
she finds.
Turning to the initial stage, before the goods have been stolen, the
owner's payoff derived from owning them is the expected value of protecting the goods less her precaution cost plus the expected value of recovering stolen goods less the cost of searching for them. She therefore
must choose the precaution level that maximizes this payoff.
Max..,p(c)v(t ° ) + '{ (1-p(c)) [x(z*)vr-z*]}-c

The first term is the expected value to the owner of foiling theft (the
probability of keeping the goods times their value). The second term is
the expected value of recovering stolen goods, conditional on searching
optimally for them-the probability that the goods are stolen times the
probability that the goods are found times the value of found goods, less
the cost of searching. The last term is the owner's precaution cost. The
payoff to recovering stolen goods is discounted back to when the owner
chooses a precaution level because lost goods take time to find. 52 The
solution to the owner's maximization problem is:
(4) p'(c){v(t°)-[8' (x(z*)v-z*]} = 1
The left-hand side of Expression (4) is lower than the left-hand side
of Expression (1), the expression for social welfare, because the bracketed term in (4) is positive (the owner does not search unless the expected gain from search exceeds the cost). The owner thus chooses a
suboptimal precaution level. Denoting as c' the privately optimal level of
owner precaution that solves Expression (4), we have c' < c*. Intuitively,
O's incentive to prevent theft is too low because she may recover the
goods. 53 The possibility of recovery creates a disincentive to take precau52.

The analysis assumes that the goods are not found until time t0 so the discount

factor is V .

53. To make this result clear, if 0 could promptly recover stolen goods, her incentive
to prevent theft falls to zero. Formally, we would have 8 = 1; x(z*) = 1; and v, -- v(t°). The
term in braces in Expression (4) would then be negative, so 0 would take no precautions

at all. As shown, for first best efficiency the bracketed term should be zero so the left-hand
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tions but is partly mitigated by the cost of delay. The longer it takes to
locate stolen goods, the lower the payoff to recovering them, so the
54
higher is the payoff to preventing theft initially.
b. The Buyer's Problem. - The buyer's payoff from purchasing is the
expected value of the goods to him if he gets a good title (the goods were
not stolen) or if his title is bad but the owner never locates the goods.
The buyer's problem is to choose the investigation level that maximizes
this payoff.
MaXWvb[g(w) + (1-g(w))(1-x(z*))]-w

The first term in brackets is the probability that the buyer assigns to
purchasing a good title; the second term is the joint probability that his
title is defective but despite optimal owner search he is not found; and
the last term is the buyer's inquiry cost.
The solution is:
(5) g'(w)vbx(z*)

=

1

We denote as w° the privately optimal level of inquiry that satisfies
Expression (5). Were x(z*), the probability that the owner finds the
buyer, to equal one, Expression (5) would reduce to Expression (2): The
buyer's inquiry level would more closely approach the social preference.
Because x(z*) commonly is less than one, the buyer reduces his investigation level below this optimum (w ° < w*). Intuitively, B's return from inquiring into his seller's title falls as the likelihood that B will lose the
goods falls. As is apparent, the buyer's investigation level is increasing in
x(z*), so owner search and buyer inquiry are complements: As 0 increases her search, B's inquiries into title become more productive.
We summarize the analysis up to this point in Proposition One:
side of (4) should be p'(c)v(t°). When the owner can recover stolen goods, she chooses a
precaution level such that the bracketed term lies between zero and one, which is
inefficient.
54. Formally, 8 < 1, so the discount factor becomes smaller as the time to find stolen
goods gets larger. The owner's incentive to prevent theft increases toward the socially
optimal level as the second term in braces in Expression (4) falls, We justify here an
important assumption. Under the current theft rule, the owner may take no precautions
and still recover stolen goods. To pursue this effect of the theft rule, denote the probability
of no theft when the owner takes no precautions as p(0) and the expected value of found
goods-the bracketed term in the owner's maximization problem-as [e]. Let Ap =
p(c°)-p(0). Here Ap measures the productivity of precautions: The bigger it is, the more
productive precautions are. Then, saving the algebra, 0 takes some precaution when
Ap8"{v(t 0)-[s]} > c. Intuitively, 0 takes some precaution when precaution is productive
(Ap is big); the owner values the goods highly (v(t ° ) is big); and the expected value of
finding the goods is low ([e] is small). A way to put the last factor is that the owner takes
precautions to prevent theft when the likelihood of finding stolen goods is low or when the
value of found goods is much less than the value of goods when originally owned (vr <<
v(tO)). To be sure, delay does not necessarily reduce the value of discovery in all cases. For
example, the owner, in pursuing an action in conversion against the buyer, may be able to
recover the depreciated value of found goods.
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When the owner can recover stolen goods, she takes suboptimalprecautions to prevent theft but searches optimally for stolen goods; the buyer
takes suboptimal precautions to ensure that he receives a good title.
2. The Voidable Title Rule (and Its Variants: Entrustment and Market
Overt). - Consider now the voidable title exception to the American
theft rule. Recall that under the voidable title rule a transferee who
wrongfully misappropriates the goods receives a voidable title if the
owner "delivered [the goods] under a transaction of purchase." 55 A party
with voidable title can convey a good title to a good faith purchaser for
value. 56 The owner then cannot recover goods that the initial transferee
misappropriated. In the usual case, the transferee/thief5 7 pays by check
or the sale is denominated "for cash." The thief s title is voidable because
the owner can recover the goods from him if the check is dishonored or
the cash is not paid.58 The thief, however, sells the goods to a third party.
The owner takes greater precautions to prevent theft under this rule
than under the stolen goods rule because she is less likely to recover the
goods. For the same reason, however, the owner searches less for misappropriated goods under this rule. Formally, the probability that 0 can
recover the goods now is the product of the probability that she finds
them times the probability that the buyer fails to persuade a court that he
made the purchase in good faith. We let g(w') be the probability that the
buyer is persuasive at cost w'. Then the probability that the owner can
recover misappropriated goods is x(z) (1-g(w')), which we denote x(z").
The probability that the owner actually recovers misappropriated goods is
less than the probability that the owner finds the buyer (x(z vt ) < x(z*)).
This is because the probability that a court will find B to have purchased
in good faith is positive (0 < (1-g(w')) < 1). Intuitively, the buyer may
persuade the court that he acted in good faith so there is a positive
probability that 0 cannot recover the goods even if she finds them. As a
result, 0 chooses an inefficiently low search level. The voidable title rule
thus reduces the owner's precaution inefficiency but creates a search
59
inefficiency.

55. u.C.C. § 2-403 (1) (2011).
56. Id.
57. Even though the goods in this case are not "stolen" from the owner but rather are
misappropriated, it is appropriate to designate this transferee as a "thief' because his
acquisition of the goods is accomplished through "larceny by trick," and thus is a violation
of the criminal law. Id. cmt. 2.
58. E.g., Atlas Auto Rental Corp. v. Weisberg, 281 N.Y.S.2d 400, 403-04 (1967).
59. Summarizing the reasoning above, when the term x(z) is substituted in O's
maximization problem, the second term in brackets in the solution, Expression (4),
becomes smaller so the left-hand side of (4) becomes larger, implying that 0 chooses a
higher precaution level. Denoting the precaution level that 0 chooses under the voidable
tide rule c', we have c' < c' < c*. Expression (3), however, changes to x(z")v, = 1, which
reflects a suboptimal level of search.
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To understand how the voidable title rule influences buyer behavior,
assume initially that only this rule applies. 60 The buyer now keeps the
goods if (1) the owner cannot locate him, or (2) the owner locates him
but a court finds that he purchased in good faith. On the assumption that
only one rule applies, the buyer's problem is to choose the level of inquiry that maximizes his payoff from purchasing.
Max.'vb[(1-(x(z')) + x(z')g(w')]-w'
The first term in brackets is the probability that the owner cannot
find the buyer; the second term is the probability that the owner locates
the buyer times the probability that a court finds the buyer to be in good
faith. The last term in the Expression is the buyer's cost when he must
appear to be in good faith. The solution to the buyer's problem is:

(6) g'(w')[Vb(xXZV)] = 1
Comparing Expressions (5) and (6), the buyer chooses a lower inquiry level under the voidable tide rule than under the theft rule for two
reasons. First, the probability that the owner recovers misappropriated
goods is less than the probability that the owner recovers stolen goods
because the owner reduces her search intensity. Consequently, the buyer
invests less in inquiry. The logic is that inquiry is less productive for B
when he is less likely to be discovered. The second factor is more subtle.
Again comparing the two solutions to the buyer's problem, B would inquire less under the voidable title rule if g' (w') < g' (w); that is, if the
buyer's marginal cost of establishing good faith is less than his marginal
cost of inquiring into his seller's title. This inequality would be satisfied
were it easier for the buyer to appear to act in good faith than to make an
optimal inquiry. As it happens, United States commercial law does create
a relaxed standard of inquiry for buyers of misappropriated goods. Section 1-201(20) of the U.C.C. defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact and
the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing."6 1
The comment to this section also suggests that good faith requires less of
the buyer than taking good care would require: "'[F]air dealing' . . . is
concerned with the fairness of conduct rather than the care with which
an act is performed. This is an entirely different concept than whether a
62
party exercised ordinary care in conducting a transaction."
We summarize the analysis of the voidable title rule with Proposition
Two:
The voidable title rule increases an owner's incentive to invest optimally in precautions to prevent involuntary transfer but decreases the
60. Our assumption here accurately describes jurisdictions that adopt the Market
Overt rule, which protects good faith purchasers from merchants.

61. U.C.C. § 1-201(20).
62. Id. cmt.
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owner's incentive to search optimally for transferred goods. The rule decreases the buyer's incentive to ensure that he is purchasinga good title.
The voidable title rule is inefficient in two respects. First, the competing effects summarized in Proposition Two are unlikely to offset. Hence,
the voidable tide rule is ex ante inefficient. Second, while an owner probably values her goods more highly than the thief does, the owner may or
may not value the goods more highly than the ultimate buyer does.
Therefore, society should want the owner and buyer to bargain over
which of them is the ultimate owner. The search dampening effect of the
voidable title rule reduces the likelihood of such bargains taking place
below the likelihood under the theft rule. The voidable title rule thus is
ex post inefficient as well.
This analysis applies to all voidable tide cases, but it may also be helpful to note its application to the U.S. entrustment rule and the Market
Overt rule that applies in a number of other countries. Entrustment and
Market Overt are particular species of the voidable title genus. For example, the entrustment rule provides that an owner who entrusts his goods
"to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind" cannot recover the goods
from a buyer who purchased them "in ordinary course of business. '63 An
ordinary course purchase is made in good faith from a "merchant who
deals in goods of that kind." 64 Similarly, the Market Overt rule protects a
good faith purchaser for value who buys stolen goods from a merchant
dealer. 65 Both of these rules are defective in the ways that the voidable
66
title rule is defective.
To summarize, the American theft rule reduces the owner's incentive to take precautions to below first best because the owner can recover
stolen goods, but it creates first best incentives for the owner to search for
stolen goods because she can reclaim them. The voidable title rule-as
well as the Market Overt rule followed in one form or another in many
countries and the entrustment rule in the U.C.C.-has the opposite effect: This class of rules increases the owner's incentive to take precautions
to prevent the initial transfer to the misappropriating transferee because
the probability that she can recover the goods falls; conversely, this class
of rules reduces the owner's incentive to search for misappropriated
goods because the probability that she can recover them also falls. The
American rules are inefficient in another way. Propositions One and Two
show that the buyer has different incentives to inquire into title under the
theft rule than he has under the voidable title rule. When the buyer
makes a purchase decision, however, he does not know the goods' "legal
63. Id. § 2403(2).
64. Id. §§ 1-201(9), 2-403(2).
65. See, e.g., Sale Law, 5728-1968, § 34 (Isr.), translated in 1 Business Laws of Israel,
supra note 15, at 1.5-79, 1.5-85 (mandating that good faith purchaser of stolen goods from
merchant-dealer who takes possession of goods prevails over rights of original owner).
66. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text (discussing inefficiencies of
voidable title rule).
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origin"-whether the goods were stolen, delivered under a transaction of
purchase, or entrusted. The buyer will thus not choose the inquiry level
67
that would be optimal for him under either rule.
3. The Need to Abandon the Property Rights Paradigm.- We have shown
that every good faith purchase rule is inefficient in some respect. Since
perfection is hard to achieve, there remains a question whether one of
the property-based rules is sufficiently more efficient than the others as to
justify its retention. Unfortunately, the information necessary to make
this comparison is inaccessible to a policymaker: Private information thus
precludes taking this inquiry very far.
Society would like to allocate the property right to the party who is
most productive in reducing theft. To see how it might proceed, we denote the marginal productivity of owner precautions as MPo and the marginal productivity of buyer inquiries as MPb. Now consider a move from
the theft rule to the Market Overt rule. Proposition One shows that this
move would increase the owner's incentive to take precautions: The efficiency gain is AMPo. Proposition Two shows, however, that the move
would reduce a buyer's incentive to inquire because the owner searches
less and because the good faith standard requires less of buyers than an
optimal inquiry requires: The efficiency loss from reducing the buyer's
incentives is AMPb. Therefore, moving from the theft rule to the Market
Overt rule would create a net welfare gain only ifAMPo-AMPb > 0.
No state institution could recover the information necessary to make
this comparison. As argued above, the marginal productivities require local knowledge to evaluate, such as the comparative effectiveness of guarding a particular warehouse versus purchasing only from reputable stores
that sold the warehoused goods. A policymaker thus would have difficulty
evaluating a particular context, and would face insurmountable difficulties globally because the efficiency calculus varies across contexts. This
reasoning shows that the social goal-to induce privately optimal precaution choices-cannot be achieved within the property rights paradigm. In
Part III, we next develop a reform proposal that is more likely to yield
efficiency.
III. A

PROPOSED SOLUTION: NEGLIGENCE PROXIES

The owner's incentives can be improved under a negligence rule
that permits her to recover the goods only if she invested efficiently in
care. The rule would require the owner to choose the precaution level
that she would have chosen if she could not recover lost goods. An owner
would retain her property right only if she satisfied the negligence standard. Hence, if workable, the standard would increase the owner's precaution level to first best without worsening her incentive to search for
67. A sophisticated buyer may assign probabilities to the various legal possibilities and
then choose an intermediate inquiry level. There is no reason to believe that the result
would be more efficient than the result either rule alone induces.
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stolen goods.68 Buyers, in effect, are strictly liable under this proposal:
They always lose to nonnegligent owners. A negligence rule is necessary
for owners because they face conflicting incentives. An owner's incentive
to protect her property is partly counterbalanced by her ability to recover
that property if it is stolen. The owner's precaution level must be regulated directly to overcome this offsetting effect. In contrast, buyers need
only inquire into their seller's title, so strict liability can helpfully move
the buyer closer to the optimal inquiry level. An additional virtue of a
broad negligence rule is its unitary property: The rule would apply both
to stolen and misappropriated goods so the buyer would know what inquiry level the law seeks to induce.
The negligence rule that we propose surpasses two other possible
solutions to the good faith purchase problem. The first is to have stolen
or misappropriated goods escheat to the state. The virtue of this reform is
that both the owner and the buyer would then take optimal precautions
because they both lose the goods. The defect of the proposal is that it
eliminates the owner's incentive to search for lost goods. A negligence
rule is preferable to the escheat rule because negligence also creates optimal incentives for owners, if negligence would work, while retaining the
owners' optimal incentive to search. The second solution is to use a comparative negligence rule. 69 Such a rule cannot be adopted in its simple
version because property is seldom divisible. An owner who is 60% negligent cannot be given 40% of a Rembrandt. Thus, comparative negligence
could work only if the state auctioned off stolen or misappropriated
goods and divided the proceeds according to the parties' negligence.
Given the volume and variety of stolen goods, the additional deterrence
such a procedure would generate would likely be insufficient tojustify the
procedure's costs.
Part III.A shows how a negligence solution ameliorates the inefficiencies noted above. This Part assumes that courts can directly observe negligent behavior. In Part III.B, we relax this sometimes unrealistic assumption to argue that courts can observe "proxy behaviors" that correlate well
with the presence of negligence. Finally, in Part III.C we discuss optimal

68. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. Formally, a negligence rule, if
effective, changes the owner's maximization problem to the problem that Expression (1)
solves rather than the problem that Expression (4) solves. That is, the owner is induced to
take first-best precautions. The standard does not affect the problem that Expression (3)
solves because the owner does not search for goods unless she loses them.
69. Under a comparative negligence rule, if both the injurer and the victim fail to
take due care, each party bears a fraction of the accident losses. The fraction is based on
comparing the degree to which each party's actual precautions departed from the optimal
level. The incentive effects of a comparative negligence rule are discussed in Shavell,
Foundations, supra note 29, at 187. As we note below, the current version of Article 3 of
the U.C.C. adopts a comparative negligence rule in allocating responsibility between
owners and good faith purchasers of forged or altered negotiable instruments. See U.C.C.
§§ 3-404 to 3-406; infra note 92.
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property rules for cases when neither party is negligent or when both
parties are negligent.
A. The Case for Negligence Rules
1. Theft. - We begin with the theft case. Under current law, 0
chooses the protection level that c' achieves rather than the higher optimal level c* because she can recover stolen goods. Under our proposal, 0
cannot recover stolen goods unless she invests c*. To see why the owner
will comply with a negligence rule, let her first consider choosing a lesser
precaution level, c < c*. If she chooses c, then she cannot recover the
goods. But, realizing that she cannot recover the goods, she revises and
instead chooses the optimal level c*. 7 0 The search for stolen goods necessarily begins after the owner has invested in precaution. The owner then
has a right to recover the goods because she had invested c*. When she
7 1
has this right, she chooses the optimal search level Z*.
The buyer's inquiry level remains inefficiently low because the owner
may not find him. The "finding probability" is unchanged under a seller
negligence rule because the owner searches optimally both under current law and under the proposed reform. We summarize this reasoning
in the following Proposition Three:
If an owner can recover stolen goods only if she chose the optimal
precautionlevel to protect againsttheft, the owner voluntarily chooses the
optimal precautionlevel and the optimal search level. The buyer of stolen
goods continues to invest too little in checking title because the owner
may not find him.
2. Voidable Title. - Under the current voidable title rule, the owner
chooses the higher (but still suboptimal) precaution level c ' because her
chance of recovering misappropriated goods is less than under the theft
rule. But conversely, the owner chooses a lower search level z' for the
same reason: She has less chance of recovering the goods. A negligence
rule would bar the owner's recovery unless the owner optimally investigated potential transferees-that is, unless she invested c*. 72 An owner
70. See supra Part II.B (modeling owner's precaution level).
71. See supra Proposition One. Note that the presence of owner's insurance should
not negatively affect the incentives to search for stolen goods, as the insurer is subrogated
to the owner's rights-the insurer, that is, has an absolute right to keep what it finds.
Hence, the insurer would search efficiently so as to reduce losses from settling claims. On
the other hand, a negligence rule will increase the insurer's incentives to monitor the
actions of the insured and to use its expertise to propose precautions: More effective
precautions by the owner reduce the insurer's risk exposure. Thus, by raising premiums or
deductibles, or by requiring certain precautions (e.g., an alarm system attached to a
valuable painting), insurers can induce conduct that the owner would not otherwise have
taken. For discussion see Victor P. Goldberg, The Devil Made Me Do It: The Corporate
Purchase of Insurance, 5 Rev. L. & Econ. 541, 544 (2009).
72. Here precaution entails optimally investigating a transferee.
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who did choose c* would have an absolute right to recover the goods; this
would induce her to invest optimally in search.
The buyer chooses an inefficiently low level of inquiry in the voidable title case for two reasons: The owner may not find him, and it costs
buyers less to appear to be in good faith than to make a due care inquiry.
A broad negligence rule for owners eliminates the second reason: The
buyer cannot keep the goods if a nonnegligent owner finds him. This
reasoning leads to Proposition Four:
If an owner can recover voluntarily transferred but misappropriated goods only if she chooses an optimal precaution level, the owner
behaves efficiently regarding both precaution and search. The buyer
chooses a higher inquiry level than under current law, because he always
loses if the owner finds him, but this level remains suboptimal because
the owner may not find him.
The proposed negligence rule is incomplete, however, because the
good faith purchase problem raises a variant of the underenforcement
concern. In accident law, the concern is that potential injurers take
suboptimal care because not every victim sues. 73 In good faith purchase
law, the parallel concern is that buyers will take suboptimal care because
not every owner finds her goods. The two standard solutions to the underenforcement concern seem inapt in our context. One solution is to
require the injurer to pay punitive damages, which are the grossed up
value of the losses of those victims who sue; the other solution is to make
a losing defendant pay the plaintiffs attorneys' fees. 74 However, few individual buyers could pay a punitive damages award, 75 and paying attorneys' fees also may unduly tax the resources of individual buyer
defendants.
A third solution, requiring dealer-buyers to pay nondisclaimable civil
tort fines to the state, is more promising. 76 The details of a tort fine
scheme require more attention than this Essay gives, but its essence can
be briefly sketched. Under the proposal, the losing party-owner or
73. For discussion of this underenforcement concern, see generally Steven Shavell,
The Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. Legal
Stud. 333 (1982).
74. For discussion of both approaches, see generally Louis Kaplow, Private Versus
Social Costs in Bringing Suit, 15J. Legal Stud. 371 (1986); Peter S. Menell, A Note on the
Private Versus Social Incentives to Sue in a Costly Legal System, 12J. Legal Stud. 41 (1983);
Susan Rose-Ackerman & Mark Geistfeld, The Divergence Between Social and Private
Incentive to Sue: A Comment on Shavell, Menell, and Kaplow, 16 J. Legal Stud. 483
(1987).
75. Under a gross-up solution, let there be Q owners whose goods were stolen, and let
q of them find the ultimate buyer. Then a buyer faces the probability q/Q = a of being
dispossessed. A buyer who is found would have to pay v,/a as damages. This liability could
be large because the probability of being found, a, is usually small.
76. The benefit of using civil fines to improve incentives was first proposed in Michael
Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability, 44 Rev. Econ.
Stud. 561, 566-67 (1977).
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buyer-would be authorized to report dealers who have sold stolen or
misappropriated goods to a state consumer protection agency. The
agency would then levy and collect a fine set by statute as a multiplier of
the value of the affected goods, with the multiplier reflecting the local
likelihood that stolen goods are recovered. The losing party would be
77
encouraged to report by being awarded a small fraction of the fine.
Our negligence/tort fine proposal, if workable, would lower the
theft level and so help to realize the social goals that private agents ignore. To see why, assume that thieves choose their theft intensity by
equating the marginal costs and benefits of crime. The negligence solution would increase the precaution level that owners choose, and so increase the marginal costs of theft. The marginal return to theft is a function of (1) the demand for particular stolen goods (e.g., the iPad 2),
which our reforms do not affect; and (2) the buyer's purchase cost, which
partly is a function of the inquiry level buyers choose. Buyers would increase their inquiry level under the proposed owner-negligence rule because the rule withdraws from buyers the defense of purchasing in good
faith: Buyers would lose whenever owners find them. When buyers increase precautions, the return to selling stolen goods falls. Our proposal
thus lowers the theft level because it increases the marginal cost and
reduces the marginal return from theft. Consequently, it is worth exploring whether our proposal is practical. To implement the proposal directly, two assumptions must hold: (1) A court can specify the optimal
negligence standard for owners, c*; and (2) parties can verify compliance
with c*, or its absence, to a court. These assumptions may not hold in
many real-world contexts given the difficulties of establishing and verifying compliance with negligence standards by direct proof.78 We next argue in Part III.B that verifiable proxies for the real variables of interest do
exist, and that those proxies are likely to reduce substantially the verification costs associated with a negligence standard.
B. Using Proxies to Ameliorate the Verifiability Concern
We have argued that our proposed negligence solution would improve on the commercial law of good faith purchase but for the difficulty
of implementing a negligence rule. Implementation is a significant con77. The full fine should not be paid to the losing party because that would defeat the
incentives the negligence solution creates. A small bounty is needed, however, to insure
that a nontrivial fraction of losing parties report that their dealer sold untitled goods.
78. The difficulty of verifying compliance with broad negligence standards has been
noted. See, e.g., Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 430 (N.Y.
1991) (criticizing proposal to impose due diligence obligation on owner because "the facts
of this case reveal how difficult it would be to specify the type of conduct that would be
required for a showing of reasonable diligence"). The court also stated that "it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to craft a reasonable diligence requirement." Id. at 432. For
discussion of due diligence, see Hawkins et al., supra note 5, at 81-83 (highlighting factintensive nature of due diligence inquiry); Ben-Shahar, supra note 50, at 15-21 (analyzing
owner's incentives to take care under negligence regime).
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cern because the efficient negligence standard for protecting goods
would require 0 to choose the precaution level that 0 would voluntarily
have chosen if she were optimizing against the goods' full value to her. It
can be difficult for a court to determine what level of care that requires in
particular cases. For this reason, commercial law uses pure negligence
concepts infrequently. 79 To be sure, notions of fault infuse contract and
commercial law, ranging from prescriptions against intentional "bad behavior" to assessments of the reasonableness of an actor's behavior in assessing both liability and damages. The Restatement of Contracts identifies many of the fault principles that can be invoked in discrete settings,
80
and whose availability is thought to justify a core strict liability regime.
Strong efficiency arguments can support a tort-type analysis of party
behavior in particular cases, but courts generally reject negligence for
commercial law in order to reduce uncertainty.8 1 Typical negligence regimes use broad standards (i.e., "duty" and "reasonableness"). Courts
commonly have more difficulty verifying compliance with such standards
than with rules, such as the theft rule and its various exceptions.8 2 Consequently, importing negligence concepts into commercial law could create
uncertainty, and thereby impair parties' ability to predict how their deals
will be evaluated.8 3 It is often more costly for parties to litigate negligence
issues than to litigate under rules because enforcing a negligence standard requires layers of evidence production.8 4 For example, under a negligence standard, a party must first propose to the court the activities that
constitute "reasonable care" and then provide evidence that she performed them.8 5 The court must then choose an operative "proxy" against
79. Schwartz & Scott, Commercial Transactions, supra note 2, at 18-27.
80. Restatement (Second) of Contracts ch. 11, intro, note (1981).
81. The strong preference for strict liability in common law contract exists although
contract doctrine appears in some areas to invite a negligence analysis. For example, if a
promisor carelessly fails to take efficient precautions ex ante which results in breach ex
post, the "willful breach doctrine" invites courts to increase damages to deter such
inefficient behavior. Yet an analysis of decided cases shows that courts decline to employ
the doctrine to deter an inefficient breach. Similarly, if the promisee fails to take efficient
precautions prior to the breach that would reduce or eliminate losses, the mitigation
principle invites courts to apply a "contributory negligence" bar to recovery. Yet courts
adhere strictly to the rule that the promisee's mitigation responsibility is not triggered until
the promisor breaches. For a discussion of plausible reasons why courts adhere to strict
liability in these settings, see generally Robert E. Scott, In (Partial) Defense of Strict
Liability in Contract, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1381 (2009).
82. For discussion of rules versus standards in contracts, see generally Robert E. Scott
& George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 Yale LJ. 814, 839-55
(2006).
83. For discussion of how negligence standards may yield unpredictable results, see
generally Kenneth S. Abraham, The Trouble with Negligence, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1187
(2001).
84. Scott & Triantis, supra note 82, at 836-39.
85. Id. To illustrate, assume parties wish to pair particular future contingencies with
corresponding performance obligations, i.e., when X occurs, the promisor must pay $Y.
The parties can define X in several ways. X may be a rule, which conditions on a relatively
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which to measure a party's performance 8 6 : What observable (range of)
outcomes should count in determining whether (a range of) unobservable behavior would be "reasonable"? The evidentiary proxies a court
selects in applying a negligence standard inevitably send a noisier signal
to future parties than either the parties' direct observation of their own
actions or a judicial determination of the conformity of an act to a rule
requiring that act.
The verification problem is much reduced when repeated transactions establish behavioral patterns that can serve as useful proxies for negligent behavior. 8 7 Thus, compliance with customs in the trade and with
established professional standards are recognized proxies for reasonable
care in evaluating claims that careless commercial or professional behavior caused physical injury. 88 Indeed, at the limit, a proxy for negligence
can specify a single instance in the form of a per se rule, so that noncompliance is negligence as a matter of law. In most jurisdictions, for exam89
ple, "an unexcused violation of a statute is negligence per se."

specific fact, such as the delivery of a widget with a specified weight. Here, parties delegate
to the court only the determination of what evidence is sufficient to satisfy X. Alternatively,
X may be a standard, such as the delivery of a widget in excellent condition. Here the court
must determine not only what evidence is sufficient to establish the weight of the widget,
but also the degree to which weight is relevant to the determination of whether the widget
satisfies the standard. Id. at 826 ("Courts do not observe facts directly; rather, they make
factual determinations by relying on proxies for the truth. The performance of a
contractual obligation is proved or disproved by the presentation of evidence rather than
by the court's direct observation.").
86. We use the term "proxy" in this Essay to describe what proceduralists refer to as
the "operative facts" that are relevant to establishing compliance with rules or standards. A
precise rule narrowly confines the content of the operative facts. Indeed, in the limiting
case the rule directly specifies the evidentiary proxy. A vague standard defines a broader
space within which a court can select the evidentiary proxy that best establishes compliance
with the standard.
87. Justice Holmes famously predicted that repeated transactions would permit the
evolution of negligence proxies:
But supposing a state of facts often repeated in practice, is it to be imagined that
the court is to go on leaving the standard to the jury forever? Is it not manifest, on.
the contrary, that if the jury is, on the whole, as fair a tribunal as it is represented
to be, the lesson that can be got from that source will be learned?
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 98 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963) (1881).
88. See, e.g., The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 739-40 (2d Cir. 1932) ("Indeed in most
cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence ....Courts [however] must in the
end say what is required."); Sinclair v. Block, 633 A.2d 1137, 1141-42 (Pa. 1993) ("The law
provides that '[w] here competent medical authority is divided, a physician will not be held
responsible if in the exercise of his judgment he followed a course of treatment advocated
by a considerable number of recognized and respected professionals in his given area of
expertise.'" (quoting Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964, 969 (Pa. 1992)) (alteration in
original)); Abraham, supra note 83, at 1199 ("[D]esignating a practice as 'custom' tends to
cut down the degree of rule-making discretion exercised by the finder of fact.").
89. Abraham, supra note 83, at 1201; see also Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 815
(N.Y. 1920) (holding unexcused violation of safety statute is "negligence in itself' rather
than merely evidence of negligence).
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The use of proxies and per se rules to make negligence standards
justiciable also appears in the law of commercial paper. 90 We first describe and then build on this wisdom because there are similarities between the theft or misappropriation of valuable instruments and the theft
or misappropriation of goods. Article 3 of the U.C.C. governs property
right contests between an original owner of a lost or misappropriated instrument and a subsequent bona fide purchaser with a combination of
proxies for ordinary care and per se rules to decide negligence. 9 1
Sections 3-404 and 3-405 consider the special problems raised by the socalled impostor or "fictitious payee" cases. Where an impostor induces
the issuer (i.e., the owner) of an instrument to issue it in the name of the
impostor or in the name of a fictitious payee, the issuer is per se negligent
and loses to a good faith "purchaser" (i.e., a person who takes the instrument for value), unless the good faith purchaser failed to exercise ordinary care in taking the instrument. 9 2 Similarly, under section 3-405, the
"owner" of an instrument is per se negligent if a trusted employee forges
an indorsement and transfers the instrument to a good faith purchaser
for value who exercises ordinary care. 93 Section 3-103(a) (9) defines ordinary care as the observance of prevailing commercial standards in the
local area and further specifies a per se rule absolving banks from negli94
gence liability if they fail to examine the instrument prior to payment.
Building on these solutions, we partition stolen and misappropriated
goods into two categories: (1) "anonymous" goods, and (2) "identifiable"
90. In addition to the example of commercial paper, negligence principles have also
been applied potentially to preclude the owner of real property from reclaiming mineral
rights under a misappropriated deed that was transferred to a good faith purchaser. Hauck
v. Crawford, 62 N.W.2d 92, 94 (S.D. 1953).
91. The nemo dat principle applies to negotiable instruments as well. Thus, as a
general rule, neither a thief nor a good faith purchaser from the thief can acquire property
rights superior to that of the original owner. Article 3 of the U.C.C. then provides several
exceptions to the nemo dat principle. In addition to the familiar rule that a thief of bearer
paper can transfer good title to a holder (U.C.C. § 3-201 (b) (2011)), sections 3-404, 3-405,
and 3-406 specify exceptions to the theft rule that apply to instruments that require an
indorsement by the owner to transfer title. That these exceptions rely on negligence
principles is perhaps less surprising once we recall that the principal drafter of Article 3 in
the initial U.C.C. project was William Prosser. For discussion of the negligence rules in
Article 3, see Clayton P. Gillette, Rules, Standards, and Precautions in Payment Systems, 82
Va. L. Rev. 181 (1996).
92. U.C.C. § 3-404(a), (d). The 1990 revisions to Article 3 of the U.C.C. adopted a
comparative negligence rule in section 3-404(d) (as well as in sections 3-405(b) and 3406(b)) in lieu of the pure contributory negligence principles that applied under the pre1990 Code. While there are differences in terms of proportionate responsibility, the
underlying incentive effects are similar.
93. U.C.C. § 3-405(b).
94. U.C.C. § 3-103(a) (9). See HSBC Bank USA v. F&M Bank N. Va., 246 F.3d 335,
337-39 (4th Cir. 2001) (observing that leaving open space on check such that it could be
altered was not failure to exercise due care); Bank of Tex. v. VR Elec., Inc., 276 S.W.3d 671,
682-83 (Tex. App. 2008) (holding bank's failure to maintain written or clear verbal policy
regarding when checks should be manually examined constituted failure to observe
prevailing industry standards).
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goods. The original owner cannot prove that an anonymous good is hers
even if she discovers a buyer in possession. For example, a person may
have had her GPS stolen and observed another person with the same GPS
95
brand. The GPS may belong to the owner, but she cannot prove it.
Identifiable goods are in two categories: (1) Goods the owner can identify
by their inherent nature, such as art by known artists, certain precious
jewels, and antiquities; and (2) goods that the owner can remove from
the anonymous class, such as by tagging electronic equipment, registering automobiles, and branding animals.
The probability that owners can find anonymous goods approaches
zero. Consequently, owners take optimal precautions against theft; an
owner, that is, chooses the precaution level c*. 9 6 On the other hand,
when owners do not search, buyers take no precautions. 97 There apparently is no private law solution to this buyer inefficiency.
Our goal regarding identifiable goods is to make a negligence solution to the good faith purchase problem plausible. The proxies we recommend below should be evaluated in this spirit. The combination of
legislation and consequent litigation will determine which of these proxies, or others, will come to be legally efficacious. Commercial law cannot
develop effective proxies, however, unless it commits to a negligence
solution.
1. PrecautionsAgainst Theft. - Proxies for owner negligence fall in
two categories. First, as with negotiable instruments, owners should take
customary precautions. As examples, it could be negligence not to have a
burglar alarm, not to have a good lock for doors, not to have a safe and to
put valuables in it, not to have night lights, not to bar ground-floor windows in certain neighborhoods, not to hire guards in museums, not to
attempt to conceal valuable shipments or to hire guards for them, not to
have an internal control system that permits inventory to be tracked, not
to use security cameras, or not to bolt mobile equipment to immobile
structures.9 8 More modem methods of deterring theft include systems
95. Other examples of anonymous goods include electronic equipment that is
untagged, chopped-up automobiles, melted silverware, and cut-up diamonds. Whether
goods are anonymous or identifiable may depend on when they are taken. Thus, while an
individual GPS may be anonymous, a carton of them would be identifiable if the merchant
owner found the carton before it was broken up.
96. When x(z), the probability of recovering stolen goods, is zero, the owner solves
the same maximization problem that the social planner solves, so she invests efficiently in
precaution. Referring to Part II.C above, Expression (4) reduces to Expression (1).
97. Formally, when x(z) = 0, the left-hand side of Expression (5) becomes zero: The
marginal return from buyer inquiry vanishes so the buyer will not incur costs to check title.
Stepping outside the analysis, the purchaser may incur liability to public authorities if he
violates criminal statutes against knowingly receiving stolen goods.
98. There are a number of proxies indicative of negligence in protecting artwork.
These include factors that occur on an owner's premises, such as setting up a functioning
alarm system, placing functioning security cameras in strategic locations, hiring guards,
and placing glass protectors over paintings to preclude viewers from actually touching
artwork in a museum. Proxies also include actions post-theft, such as reporting the loss to
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that permit owners to disable lost goods from performing their functions
or that can only be operated by their owners. It may be negligence for
owners not to use such systems if their use is otherwise cost-justified.
Second, goods that can be made identifiable in a cost-justified way
should be made identifiable. As an example, it could be negligent not to
tag when tagging would be efficacious. Identification reduces the gain to
theft or misappropriation by clogging channels for selling defectively titled goods and reducing the price buyers will pay for them. Tagging is an
evolving technology. A recent Google search for "anti-theft tagging" revealed 5,800,000 entries in 0.14 seconds. 99 Thus, a negligence law for stolen goods will evolve as technology evolves. A contemporary illustration is
instructive: The use of satellite technology now permits archeologists to
identify thousands of valuable antiquities at their situs and thus monitor
them for theft or damage.10 0 By employing this technology, the Getty
Conservation Institute in Los Angeles has built a web-based system that
uses satellite images to identify antiquities in over 10,000 sites in Jordan. 10 1 This system, once expanded to other countries, would be an effective tool both to deter looting and to aid in the search for stolen objects.
2. Proxies for Search. - Our proposal creates an incentive for the
nonnegligent owner to search optimally. Thus, there apparently is no
need to evaluate how efficiently owners search. Out-of-equilibrium behavior sometimes occurs, however. For example, a nonprofit owner, such as
a museum, may be dilatory. Thus, we would permit a buyer to raise the
defense of negligence in owner search. Proxies for such negligence thus
local police or domestic Interpol or customs officials, registering the stolen item with a
country's customs office and with organizations such as the Art Loss Register, a group
based in New York that tracks lost or stolen works of art and employs private investigators
to track it. See, e.g., 11 from Egypt Ministry Sentenced for Negligence, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13,
2010, at C3 (describing how "[e]leven employees of Egypt's cultural ministry were
sentenced to three years in prison for negligence that led to the theft of a van Gogh
painting from a museum in Giza in August... [which had] only some working cameras
and no working alarms"); Kristen Chick, The Thieves Had It Easy in Cairo Art Heist,
Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 24, 2010, at 13-14 (enumerating failures that led to
negligence charges, including (1) "[n]one of the alarms meant to protect the artwork in
the museum sounded," (2) "[o]nly seven of 43 security cameras were working," (3)
paintings lacked glass protectants and hung easily within reach of viewers, and (4) "guards
were scarce enough that the thieves were able to drag a couch underneath the painting to
stand on while cutting the $55 million painting from its frame in broad daylight"). Julian
Radcliffe, founder of The Art Loss Register, which maintains a stolen art database,
explained: "[P ] roperly protecting artwork is no simple task. It requires costly technological
safeguards, such as burglar alarms and camera surveillance, and guards in every room." Id.
99. Search Results for "Anti-Theft Tagging", Google.com, http://www.google.com/
search?q=Anti-Theft+Tagging (last visited Sept. 12, 2011) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
100. As one archeologist observed: "The classic rule in preservation is that you can't
preserve something until you know you have it." Randy Kennedy, In History-Rich Region, a
Very New System Tracks Very Old Things, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 2010, at C1 (quoting
Timothy P. Whalen, Dir. of Getty Conservation Inst.).
101. Id.
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are helpful. Tagging or otherwise identifying goods facilitates search. The
corollary is that the failure to so identify goods reduces the incentive to
search for them, and therefore should be regarded as a search inefficiency. Moreover, search should be diligent and timely. The high profile
art cases suggest that owners can find inherently identifiable goods, and
prompt search may turn up goods that are in a transiently identifiable
state. 10 2 In the case of stolen art, search is aided by the growth of online
10 3
art registries that can track stolen or lost art.
The existence of proxies for reasonable search raises the question
how a timely search, or its absence, can be shown. A number of commentators have argued for an adverse possession rule for stolen personal
property. 10 4 Under this regime, the statute of limitations in replevin runs
from the time of the first possession by a dealer or other good faith purchaser.10 5 This rule is easy to administer but does not relate directly to
the behavior the law should encourage. The shift in a number of
American states to a "discovery" rule for recovery of identifiable stolen
goods is a preferable means of implementing a negligence regime. Under
such a regime, the statute of limitations begins to run when the owner
"discovers or should have discovered" the loss of her goods. 10 6 The
courts' discretion under this rule could be confined by verifiable proxies
102. Examples of transiently identifiable goods include goods that are in an original,
labeled package or have not had tags disabled.
103. See, e.g., Guillermo Contreras, Painting Sold in S.A. Ruled to Be Stolen, San
Antonio Express-News, Jan. 15, 2010, at B3 (citing U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement and Art Loss Register as critical players in returning stolen art from San
Antonio to French museum from which it was stolen in 1980s by notifying French
authorities after stolen painting was submitted to auction); Greg Quill, Canada Hot for
Stolen Art, Toronto Star, Mar. 27, 2010, at 4 (suggesting various options for owners of
stolen artwork, including reporting theft to local Interpol office, or registering stolen item
with country's customs and with Art Loss Register).
104. See, e.g., John P. Dawson, Fraudulent Concealment and Statutes of Limitation,
31 Mich. L. Rev. 875, 897-901 (1933) ("With the positive result of adverse possession, in
transferring title to the adverse possessor of chattels, there need be no quarrel and there is
very little doubt in American decisions."). See generally Patty Gerstenblith, The Adverse
Possession of Personal Property, 37 Buff. L. Rev. 119 (1988); R.H. Helmholz, Wrongful
Possession of Chattels: Hornbook Law and Case Law, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1221 (1986);
Nicholas D. Ward, The Georgia Grind: Can the Common Law Accommodate the Problems
of Title in the Art World, Observations on a Recent Case, 8J.C. & U.L. 533 (1982).
105. See, e.g., Gaillard v. Hudson, 8 S.E. 534, 534-35 (Ga. 1889) (permitting buyer to
tack prior purchasers' periods of possession); Dragoo v. Cooper, 72 Ky. 629, 632 (1873)
("[WIe perceive no valid reason why the rule of construction adopted in suits relating to
realty shall not be applied in actions for the recovery of personalty."); Burroughs Adding
Mach. Co. v. Bivens-Corhn Co., 119 P.2d 58, 59 (Okla. 1941) (holding that using typewriter
in plain view at business for long period of time constituted "open and notorious
possession"); Hull v. Davidson, 25 S.W. 1047, 1047-48 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894) (finding for
buyer who had been "claiming and holding [a horse] notoriously and adversely"); Dee v.
Hyland, 3 P. 388, 388-89 (Utah 1883) (finding for purchaser whose use of horse was open
and notorious).
106. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. A growing number of American
jurisdictions have adopted the "discovery" rule for triggering the statute of limitations in
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whose absence implies search negligence. As examples, owners should
report thefts of identifiable goods to the police, list stolen goods on computerized databases or otherwise advertise their loss, publicize searches,
check sale catalogues of notable art and antiquities, and in some cases
hire professional searchers.
3. Proxiesfor Buyer Inquiry. - Under our proposal, the law need not
evaluate the buyer's behavior. As argued above, the buyer should lose to a
10 7
nonnegligent owner regardless of the inquiry level the buyer chose.
Moreover, we argue below that when both owner and buyer are negligent, the buyer should be permitted to keep the goods. 10 8 As a consequence, the buyer prevails against a negligent owner regardless of the
inquiry level he chose. Since our proposal requires the buyer always to
lose if the owner is not negligent and permits him always to win if the
owner is negligent, adopting the proposal requires the state to create incentives only for owners. 10 9
If a state wishes to retain the distinction between the theft and voidable title cases, however, it should require the buyer to exercise due care
in making a title inquiry (rather than the lower good faith standard). A
buyer makes an optimal investigation into his seller's title when he invests
w*. But again there is a verifiability problem: A court would have difficulty determining w*. As with the owner, this problem can be ameliorated by providing appropriate proxies for negligence. We would define
negligence by a buyer as buying from a nonstandard source, or purchasing goods at a dramatic (more than twofold) discount from the current
market price of similar goods,1 10 or ignoring a tag or other standard
method of identification. These verifiable proxies should improve the
functioning of a voidable title rule.
C. Property Rules When Neither Party Is Negligent or Both Are
When neither party is negligent or when both are, the law must allocate property rights between the parties. We argue that the owner should
prevail as between two nonnegligent parties for two reasons. First, the
contrary rule-that the buyer wins-is inefficient. To be sure, the owner's
incentive to take precautions would be unaffected by a switch to the contrary rule. Under either rule, the owner loses unless she takes optimal
care, so she takes optimal care. However, the nonnegligent owner's incentive to search for lost goods under the contrary rule would be reduced
because she could not recover the goods if the buyer behaved nonnegreplevin. Steven A. Bibas, Note, The Case Against Statutes of Limitations for Stolen Art,
103 Yale L.J. 2437, 2446-48 (1994).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
108. See infra notes 113-114 and accompanying text.
109. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
110. When a market exhibits price dispersion, purchase at a price that is more than
one standard deviation below the mean would be considered to be in bad faith, as such a
price is likely to be below the cost of reputable dealers.
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ligently. The buyer's incentive to take care would also be reduced because his return from inquiry falls as his probability of being found falls.
Hence, letting the buyer prevail when neither party is negligent creates
three inefficiencies: (1) The owner's incentive to search is reduced; (2)
the buyer's incentive to inquire into title is weakened even further; and
(3) because the owner searches less, the probability that the parties will
bargain to permit the highest valuing party to own the goods falls. In
contrast, if the owner prevails when neither party is negligent, the owner
has first-best incentives and the buyer's inefficiency is unchanged. Thus,
efficiency considerations imply that the owner should prevail whenever
she takes optimal precautions to prevent theft.1 1 '
Second, letting the owner prevail also follows from the premise that
private law rules should not redistribute entitlements unless good instrumental reasons exist for doing so. We assumed above and argue below
that owner negligence is a sufficient reason to cut off an owner's property
right. Encouraging the free flow of commerce is a second and often asserted reason to cut off the owner's rights. The social goal, however,
should not be to encourage buyers to purchase goods simpliciter, but to
encourage nonnegligent buyers to purchase goods."12 Letting the buyer
prevail when neither party is negligent would partly defeat this goal. And
since there are no instrumental reasons to prefer innocent buyers to innocent owners, the premise that redistribution is a public law function
should control.
In contrast, the law should protect the buyer when both parties are
negligent. Our goal here is to minimize the disruption that involuntary
dispossessions can cause. When the owner locates the goods, she has already been disrupted by theft or misappropriation. Alternatively, she has
not been disrupted at all because she had delivered the goods under a
transaction of purchase and so expected not to get them back."13 Therefore, the owner's disruption costs are sunk (or never existed) when the
law must make an allocation decision, and the owner has likely accommodated as well as she could to her loss. In contrast, the buyer has adjusted
to owning the goods, not to losing them. Imposing the loss on the owner
thus punishes her negligent behavior but does not further injure her.
111. This argument shows that our analysis illuminates the case when neither party is
negligent. Courts and commentators sometimes express sympathy for buyers who may be
dispossessed though they apparently purchased in good faith. We offer two comments by
way of rebuttal. First, buyers keep anonymous goods because owners do not search for
them; a buyer will not lose a sweater or a stereo. Second, buyers can repurchase goods
from owners who find them. Hence, a buyer would be dispossessed only when the owner
values the goods more highly than he does. This suggests that the owner who never finds
the goods is the more sympathetic party.
112. See Schwartz & Scott, Sales Law, supra note 10, at 491 ("Metaphors of freely
flowing commerce or unclogged channels of trade do not illuminate [the good faith
purchase] issue.").
113. In this case, the owner's immediate transferee cannot respond in damages, so
she asserts an in rem claim to the goods in the hands of the third party.
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Imposing the loss on the buyer would punish his negligent behavior, but
it also would create a new injury. In this context, one negligent party
must necessarily be punished, but both parties need not be disrupted.
Thus, a negligent buyer should be permitted to keep the goods when the
1 14
owner also is negligent.
We summarize this reasoning in Proposition Five:
When neitherparty is negligent, efficiency is enhanced by allocating
the right to recover stolen or misappropriatedgoods to the originalowner.
When both parties are negligent, the goal of minimizing disruption costs
supports allocatingthe right to keep stolen or misappropriatedgoods to
the buyer.
D. Barriers to Enactment: Transition Costs and the Political Economy of Sales
Law
The verifiable negligence rule we propose raises law revision concerns. Putting political economy issues aside for the moment, good faith
purchase laws are relatively simple to revise. These laws are governed in
the United States and elsewhere largely by statute. Thus, for example,
U.C.C. § 2-403 can be readily amended to incorporate negligence principles as well as to specify appropriate proxies for negligence. The significant drafting issue is whether the Code should specify bright line proxies
for ordinary care in the form of per se statutory rules, provide courts a
choice of proxies by putting illustrations of behaviors that constitute reasonable precautions in the Code comments, or use both methods. The
solution should turn on the answer to an empirical question: How heterogeneous are the ways in which owners can take optimal precautions? Our
tentative view is that the circumstances surrounding theft or misappropriation of goods are no more heterogeneous than those that accompany
theft or misappropriation of commercial paper. Thus, we support a relatively precise statutory definition of negligent (or nonnegligent) behavior
modeled on the Article 3 treatment of verifiable negligence. This approach will give parties some guidance yet also permit common law
development.
114. A virtue of this result, as stated above, is that there is no need for courts to
evaluate buyer behavior: Buyers always lose when owners are not negligent, and buyers
always win when owners are negligent. An objection to letting negligent buyers prevail is
that buyers would behave strategically by seeking out negligent owners from whom to
purchase. This objection seems implausible. Owners behave optimally in equilibrium. In
practice, this means that many owners would behave well, so that buyers would have to
search extensively to find possibly negligent owners. Also, whether an owner invested
efficiently in precautions may not be conveniently observable to an outsider. The costs to
buyer search for negligent owners thus probably exceed the gain. Also, permitting
.passively" negligent buyers to prevail but barring "actively" negligent buyers creates
another litigation issue: A negligent owner would have an incentive to litigate the category
of buyer negligence. The social gain from so expanding good faith litigations seems too
slight tojustify the expansion.
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There is a difficult question whether interest group opposition
would block enactment of a verifiable negligence rule, either domestically or in foreign jurisdictions. We have previously argued that interest
group competition among participants in private legislative processes,
such as the processes that determine U.C.C. and Restatement content,
generate a strong status quo bias; powerful private actors can often cause
these "private legislatures" to reject significant reform. 115 Our goal in this
paper is to develop solutions to the good faith purchase problem that a
well-motivated decisionmaker would adopt. Hence, identifying politically
effective strategies for overcoming interest group opposition to such solutions is beyond our scope. We will, however, note some of the apparent
difficulties.
Original owners and ultimate buyers are numerous and widely scattered and so neither group could constitute an effective political force. In
contrast, dealers and museums that both sell and buy are already organized in associations; these groups could participate relatively conveniently
in legislative considerations. Our solution imposes additional duties on
dealers and on museums in their capacity as owners: to behave nonnegligently and to search promptly. We also advocate a version of punitive
damages for dealers: the tort fine.11 6 Museums and dealers would thus
face higher costs of doing business and would also incur transition costs:
to retrain personnel, to renegotiate relationships with intermediaries,
and to generate working groups and best practice statements. Turning to
the international arena, dealers in Market Overt regimes collect premiums because they can convert bad titles into good ones. These premiums
17
are industry specific and thus not likely to be competed away.'
Assessing the severity of the political economy barriers to enactment
is difficult as an a priori matter. As an example, increasing the costs of
current dealers may increase the barriers to entry into the dealer market.
In deciding whether to oppose our reform, dealers thus would have to
trade off the gain from strengthened market power against reform
costs.1 1 Museums are nonprofits that often receive public subsidies, and
115. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures,
143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 595, 633-38, 645-50 (1995) (modeling high probability that group
lobbying private legislature to maintain status quo will defeat similarly sized group
lobbying for rule change). One of us has applied the insights from this model to the
products of the groups formulating international rules governing the sale of goods. See
Clayton P. Gillette & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of International Sales Law, 25

Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 446, 459-73 (2005) (arguing efforts to accommodate diverse political
and economic interests result in highly abstract rules). A similar analysis of the products of
such international treaties can be found in Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and
Harmonization in International Commercial Law, 39 Va. J. Int'l L. 743, 756-87 (1999).
116. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text,
117. We are grateful to Paul Stephan for this point.
118. There is an analogy to the cigarette companies, who did not oppose bans on
advertising in many popular media. The companies' increased cost of reaching buyers was
outweighed by the ban-created barrier to the entry of new competitors. See generally E.
Woodrow Eckard, Jr., Competition and the Cigarette TV Advertising Ban, 29 Econ. Inquiry
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so museums may be sensitive to goodwill losses from being perceived to
oppose theft-deterring reforms. These considerations suggest that our reforms are not obviously infeasible politically and so at this early stage
should be considered on their merits. Further, in jurisdictions in which
the primary negligence rule cannot be enacted, emphasis should shift
from the substantive to the procedural-that is, from primary negligence
to the relevant statutes of limitations. In the art market, at least, thieves
expect that merchandise will chill over time.t19 This makes the statutes of
limitations critically important. The New Jersey "discovery" rule, which
declines to toll the statute for negligent owners, captures many of the
benefits of our proposal.1 20 Moreover, dealer resistance might be easier
to overcome if legal change were tied to reform of the statute of limitations rather than to a replacement of Market Overt with a negligence
regime.
IV.

MORAL OBJECTIONS TO A NEGLIGENCE RULE

We now consider two moral concerns that our negligence solution to
the good faith purchase problem may raise. First, are the justifications for
protecting property strong enough to overcome the efficiency case for
barring a negligent owner from recovering her goods? Moral theorists
adduce three reasons for protecting the property rights of original own1 21
ers: (1) An owner has a special or particular relationship to property;
(2) protecting property assists directly in protecting liberty or personhood;1 22 or (3) the possibility of owning property creates an incentive
to create wealth which, in turn, enhances personal autonomy.' 23 None of
these considerations should defeat a negligence solution that applies in
the voidable tide and entrustment contexts. In the voidable title case, the
owner transfers the goods with the expectation that the transferee will sell
119 (1991) (analyzing empirical study showing cigarette advertising restrictions reduced
competition and increased profit margins).
119. Ulrich Boser, The Gardner Heist: The True Story of the World's Largest
Unsolved Art Theft 20-21 (2009) (discussing why stolen pieces of art often take years to
resurface).
120. See, e.g., O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 869 (N.J. 1980) (describing how
discovery rule gained acceptance in negligence cases); supra text accompanying note 106.
121. See Simone Weil, The Need for Roots: Prelude to a Declaration of Duties
Toward Mankind 34 (Arthur Wills trans., G.P. Putnam's Sons 1952) (1949) ("Private
property is a vital need of the soul. . . . All men have an invincible inclination to
appropriate in their own minds anything which over a long, uninterrupted period they
have used for their work, pleasure or the necessities of life.").
122. See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 287 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690) ("Though the Earth and all inferior Creatures be common to all
Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person.");Charles A. Reich, The New Property,
73 Yale L.J. 733, 771 (1964) (arguing property "performs the function of maintaining
independence,

dignity

and

pluralism");

cf. Margaret Jane

Radin,

Property

and

Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957, 1005 (1982) (arguing rich theories of personhood and
human flourishing are inconsistent with commodification and property rights in persons).
123. See generally Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (1962).
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them and thereafter remit a portion of the price to the owner. A consignment sale is a common illustration of this behavior. 124 Property right considerations do not apply to the voidable title case because the owner's loss
is pecuniary. She has voluntarily parted with goods in exchange for the
promise of money, but has not been paid. She seeks the goods because
her initial transferee is judgment proof and a claim to goods may be easier to enforce against relatively innocent third parties than a claim for
money. In the entrustment case, the owner expects to get the goods back.
A common illustration of this case is where the entrustee sells goods he
was supposed to repair and return. There also cannot be a property right
objection to a negligence rule in the entrustment case because such a
rule provides even greater protection to the owner than does current
United States law; under a negligence rule, the owner prevails even over a
buyer in the ordinary course of business if she makes a nonnegligent
choice of transferee.
A negligence rule, however, does materially weaken the owner's
property right in the theft case because it grants the property right to
buyers when an owner is negligent. But the case for vindicating the original owner's property rights in the theft case is weak. Justifications based
on property as liberty or as personhood are strongly over-inclusive in the
good faith purchase context. Business firms that are fictional persons
lacking moral identities are nevertheless permitted to recover stolen
property. 125 In the same vein, individuals can recover LCD televisions
that have no unique personhood properties, as well as engagement rings
that do. A more nuanced rule that seeks to accommodate liberty and personhood values might use a negligence regime with carve outs for particular classes of property interests. We are doubtful that the administrative
costs of such a rule are justified, however, especially where an owner's
rights are cut off under a negligence rule only if she carelessly contributed to her own loss. Finally, the wealth-creating justification for protecting the original owner's property interest fails as well. Granting such
rights to a negligent owner may actually reduce wealth by encouraging
theft. A negligence rule, on the other hand, creates incentives to protect
wealth.
The second moral concern challenges the instrumental justification
for eliminating the distinction between the void and voidable title cases.
Under a verifiable negligence rule, the owner prevails in both cases if she
is not negligent; under current United States law, the owner only prevails
124. Under U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (2011), an owner's voluntary transfer enables her
transferee to convey good title to a good faith purchaser if the "goods have been delivered
[to the transferee] under a transaction of purchase." See also U.C.C. § 2-326 (stating
consignor loses to a good faith purchaser).
125. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract
Law, 113 Yale L.J. 541, 556 (2003) (arguing business firms are "artificial persons whose
autonomy the state need not respect on moral grounds, and whose morality is ordinarily
required by positive law").
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in the void tide case (there is theft) but loses in the voidable title case. 12 6
A possible justification for retaining current law may follow from the act/
omission distinction. Under this distinction, actions are more blameworthy than omissions. An owner acts when she transfers goods to a transferee, but only omits precautions when she is negligent.1 27 The act/omission distinction is an application of the doctrine of "double effect." This
doctrine, commonly applied in noncommercial contexts, distinguishes
between consequences of actions that were intended, as ends or as
means, and consequences that were only foreseen. 128 On this view, intentionally killing a person is more blameworthy than failing to take an action that would prevent the death of a person. In the former case, the
actor intended to cause a death; in the latter case, the actor did not,
though he could foresee that his failure to act would result in death. 129 As
applied here, in the voidable tide cases, the owner intends to part with
her property as the means to maximize her utility. In the void title cases,
the owner could merely foresee that her failure to take appropriate precautions would result in the loss of her property and in harm to good
faith buyers were she able to recover the property. But here the owner
did not intend to incur a loss or to harm others.
Our verifiable negligence solution collapses the distinction between
the void and voidable title cases partly because we reject the doctrine of
double effect. 130 This doctrine confuses two questions. The first is
whether an act is morally permissible. The second is whether an agent
acted in a morally permissible way when she committed the act. The former question must be answered by weighing the considerations for and
against the act; the latter question requires an assessment of the agent's
motives. To illustrate, a person may give money to a charity from base
motives, such as a desire for recognition or to spite relatives who wished
to inherit her estate. If the money will be well spent, however, the giving
of it is morally praiseworthy even though the giver is not. Similarly, a
person may drive too quickly in order to visit a sick friend, and her speeding may injure another. Here the person committed a blameworthy act,
though she intended to do good, not harm.
Law reform should focus on acts, not motives. Applying this distinction here, an owner who fails to take effective precautions against theft
126. The void/voidable title distinction seems to have become part of U.S. law in
consequence of a poorly thought out borrowing from the English common law. See supra
note 16. Other countries also make the distinction, however. See infra Appendix.
127. Some cases apparently apply this distinction. In West v. Roberts, the court
distinguished the voidable from the void title cases because in the former the owner made
a voluntary transfer of his property. 143 P.3d 1037, 1045 (Colo. 2006).
128. Alison McIntyre, Doctrine of Double Effect, in Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2009), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/
entries/double-effect (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
129. Id.
130. The following discussion owes much to Thomas Scanlon. See T.M. Scanlon,
Moral Dimensions ch. I (2009) (reviewing and analyzing relevant literature).
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encourages the theft and may cause harm to later purchasers. Her failure
thus is culpable even though she probably did not intend to harm anyone. Losing her property is an appropriate sanction. In the same vein, an
owner who voluntarily transfers property after making the right inquiries
has acted in a blameless fashion, whatever her intent may have been.
There thus seems no morally compelling reason to distinguish between
the victim of theft and the victim of misappropriation. To summarize,
there apparently is no moral objection to applying a negligence standard
to owners generally, thereby permitting only nonnegligent owners to recover goods that either were stolen or misappropriated.
V. GOOD

FAITH PURCHASE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

A. Harmonizing Good Faith Purchase Laws
In this part, we consider how the laws of various jurisdictions would
change in light of our analysis, and we also look at the costs of retaining
the status quo. 3 1 The initial issue is simple, in a sense: No jurisdiction
has adopted our modified negligence solution, so our proposal would
change the law everywhere. It may be helpful to be somewhat more concrete. In Parts III and IV, we showed how United States law would change.
Canada, England, India, and Russia also allow original owners to prevail
in the theft case, so our solution would reduce the owner's rights but
132
increase her incentive to take precautions in those jurisdictions as well.
Brazil, France, Japan, Mexico, and Switzerland vary the theft rule:
The owner prevails against an ultimate buyer in good faith only if she
reimburses the price the buyer paid. 133 Under the reimbursement version of the theft rule, the owner's incentive to take precautions against
theft increases because she no longer recovers the goods but rather recovers the goods less the cost of purchasing them a second time. For the
same reason, the owner searches suboptimally for stolen goods. The
131. Reasons for the lack of uniformity in good faith purchase laws are discussed in
Saul Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Purchaser, 16J.
Legal Stud. 43 (1987).
132. See infra Appendix. In England, Canada (Ontario), and India the owner cannot
recover under the theft rule if the owner's conduct precludes him from denying the
seller's authority to sell. However, mere negligence by the owner in failing to take
precautions against theft does not constitute grounds for invoking an estoppel..See Sale of
Goods Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.1, § 22 (Can. Ont.); Sale of Goods Act, 1979, c. 54, § 21
(Eng.); P. Ramanatha Aiyar, The Sale of Goods Act 112 (K. Venkoba Rao & R.D. Saxena
eds., 3d ed. 1988) (reproducing § 27 of Indian Sale of Goods Act as amended by Act No.
33 of 1963). As indicated in the Introduction, these jurisdictions create a legal origin
problem for buyers because two legal rules can apply to the same goods. Our unitary
reform proposal would eliminate this additional inefficiency. In Germany and Mexico, the
theft rule applies in part: The owner loses to a good faith purchaser who bought at a public
auction. See, e.g., Bfirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] § 935 (Ger.)
(Langenscheidt Translation Serv. trans., Fed. Ministry of Justice 2010); C6digo Civil
Federal [CC] art. 799 (Mex.) (Julio Romanach, Jr. trans., Lawrence Publ'g Co. 2002).
133. See infra Appendix.
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buyer's incentive to inquire into title also is reduced under the reimbursement version of the theft rule because the buyer is more likely to
keep the goods. These effects are similar to those that the voidable title
rule produces (see Proposition Two above), but the reimbursement rule
actually is less efficient than the voidable title rule for two reasons. First,
the buyer's suboptimal incentive to inquire, because the owner may not
find him, is further reduced because the law now insures the buyer's
purchase price. Second, the reimbursement version of the theft rule
dampens owner search more severely than does the voidable title rule.
To understand the second effect, realize that the owner's value for
found goods and the price at which the buyer purchased those goods are
positively correlated. Correlation exists because the owner and buyer usually have similar uses for the goods and so purchased in similar markets.
Under the pure theft rule, correlation does not matter because the owner
does not pay the buyer's price; she is entitled to recover any goods she
finds. In contrast, under the reimbursement version of the theft rule, the
owner must predict the price at which the buyer purchased because she
will search only if her expected value less the buyer's price exceeds search
costs. Correlation between the owner's value and the buyer's predicted
price likely is substantial for commercial goods with relatively unitary
uses, such as machines and trucks. The more closely the reimbursement
price approaches the owner's value, the lower is the owner's gain from
finding the goods. In turn, the lower that gain, the more likely it will be
outweighed by search costs. Owners may then not search at all. 1 34 This is
ex ante inefficient because it much reduces the buyer's incentive to inquire, and it is ex post inefficient because it reduces the possibility of an
ex post bargain under which the goods would end up in the hands of the
highest-valuing user. The pure theft rule and the voidable title rule thus
are preferable on efficiency grounds to the reimbursement version of the
35
theft rule.1
Many countries adopt the voidable title rule, and a majority of these
adopt the entrustment rule. 1 36 A number of countries adopt Market
3
134. Denoting the price of found goods as q(t ), two inequalities may hold: (1)
z; (2) X(Zrb)[Vr--q(tS)] < z. The left-hand side of (1) is the expected value of
searching for goods under the pure theft rule (finding probability times value); the righthand side is search costs. The left-hand side of (2) is the expected value of searching for
goods under the reimbursement version of the theft rule. The first term is the (lower)
probability that the owner finds the goods under this rule; the term in brackets is the
owner's net gain from recovery. As is apparent from (2), as the current price approaches
the buyer's current value, search costs are more likely to preclude owner pursuit.
135. Spain adopts the reimbursement version of the theft rule for goods bought at a
public sale and China adopts the version for goods bought at auction or at a public market.
See infra Appendix.
136. Countries that adopt the voidable title rule include the Czech Republic,
England, France, Italy, Germany, Japan, Russia, and Switzerland. Countries that also adopt
the entrustment rule include England, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and Switzerland.
See infra Appendix.
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Overt.1 37 China adopts a reimbursement version of the voidable title rule
and Brazil, China, France, Japan, Spain, and Switzerland adopt the reimbursement version for Market Overt. The reasoning above suggests that
these versions are less efficient than the rules for which they substitute.
On the other hand, a number of jurisdictions have statutes of limitations
that run from the time of theft rather than the time of discovery. These
limitation periods run from one to five years. 138 Shorter limitation periods encourage search, which is efficient.
To summarize, no advanced country has an efficient law of good
faith purchase. This defect has two causes. First, efficiency is precluded
under the property right paradigm, which countries have yet to escape.
Second, inchoate fairness notions appear to influence the rules. Thus, it
may seem unfair to require an innocent buyer to yield goods without reimbursing the price the buyer paid. It also may seem unfair, however, to
require an innocent original owner to pay for stolen goods twice. Fairness
notions thus seem indeterminate in the good faith purchase context.
Moreover, inefficient good faith purchase laws also create two categories
of cost: first, the cost to a country of having an inefficient law; second, the
costs to parties in all countries of coping with diverse inefficient laws. Our
proposed reform thus has two virtues: It would improve the private incentives of parties affected by the law everywhere, and, if adopted everywhere, it would eliminate the costs of diversity. We next focus more directly on diversity costs.
B. The Costs of Disparity in Good Faith PurchaseLaw
The laws of many advanced commercial nations protect most buyers
against the claims of nonnegligent owners of stolen goods. A consequence of these laws is the creation of potential havens for laundering
valuable stolen goods, especially art and antiquities.' 39 Owners respond
137. Italy has the most buyer-friendly version of the Market Overt rule. Article 1153 of
the Italian Civil Code provides: "He to whom movable property is conveyed by one who is
not the owner acquires ownership of it through possession, provided that he be in good
faith at the moment of consignment and there be an instrument or transaction capable of
transferring ownership." Codice Civile [C.c.] art. 1153 (It.) (Mario Beltramo et al. trans.,
Oceana 2010) (internal citations omitted). Article 1153 also provides that "[o]wnership is
acquired free of rights of others in the thing, if they do not appear in the instrument or
transaction and the acquirer is in good faith." Id. Other countries with a pure Market
Overt rule include Israel and Germany (public auction only). Brazil, China, France, Japan,
Mexico, Spain, and Switzerland have the reimbursement version of the Market Overt rule
under which the owner can reclaim his property from the good faith purchaser if he
reimburses him for his original purchase price. See infra Appendix.
138. Some illustrations of short limitation periods include Canada (one year); China
and Japan (two years); France, Mexico, and Spain (three years); and Switzerland (five
years). See infra Appendix.
139. For discussion of the trafficking in stolen art and the problem of safe haven
jurisdictions, see Harriet Crawley, Forget the Video, It's Your Paintings They're After, Daily
Telegraph (London), June 16, 1992, at 16 (discussing rise of sophisticated thieves who
exploit safe havens); The Hidden Art of Theft, U.S. News & World Rep., Apr. 2, 1990, at 13
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to this possibility by attempting to sue buyers in jurisdictions whose law,
in the instant case, favors the owners.
The resultant conflict of laws issues are complex. In multijurisdictional contests, these issues turn on the interaction between the remedy
the original owner uses to seek recovery of the goods (typically under
U.S. law through an action in replevin) and the claims of the buyer that
may trump the owner's title. The buyer's claim may be substantive, as in
the case where the buyer claims rights to the goods based on his purchase
from a merchant-seller, or it may be procedural, as when the buyer asserts
the bar of a statute of limitations. Absent choice of law considerations, an
owner seeking to recover stolen goods through a replevin action will be
motivated to bring suit in a jurisdiction such as the United States that
does not recognize the Market Overt exception to the nemo dat rule, as
well as in a state such as New York that retains the demand and refusal
rule for triggering the statute of limitations. 140 To do so, the owner need
only acquire in personam jurisdiction over the defendant buyer in New
York. Unfortunately for the owner, if the goods have been physically
moved to (or from) other jurisdictions, the application of standard
choice of law principles may well cause the forum of choice to decline to
follow its own rule.
The uncertain effect of the interaction of disparate rules governing
good faith purchase and the application of standard choice of law principles is well illustrated by the recent case of GemologicalInstitute of America,
Inc. v. Zarian Co.14 1 Zarian claimed ownership rights to a $370,000 diamond that had been stolen from its business in Dubai and subsequently
sold to Siyance Brothers' Diamond Corp. 142 Siyance claimed that a member of its family business had purchased the diamond in Israel from a
merchant dealer and then had transferred the diamond to its business in
New York where it was brought to the Gemological Institute for grading.' 4 3 The case turned on the choice of law between New York and Israel
as to the title to stolen goods: New York law applies the theft rule favoring
the original owner,144 and Israel applies a Market Overt rule favoring a
(notingJapan's laws protecting bona fide purchaser); Stanley Meisler, Art & Avarice, L.A.
Times Mag., Nov. 12, 1989, at 8, 11 (discussing Swiss law that allows good faith purchaser to
keep stolen goods);James Walsh, It's a Steal, Time, Nov. 25, 1991, at 86, 87 (commenting
on laws of Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and Cayman Islands).
140. Recall that under the demand and refusal rule, the statute of limitations does not
begin to run until the owner finds the stolen goods in the possession of the buyer, the
owner demands their return, and the buyer refuses to return them. See supra note 17 and
accompanying text.
141. No. 03 Civ. 4119 (RLE), 2006 WL 2239594 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2006).
142. Id. at *1-'2.
143. Id. at *2.
144. See Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829, 833 (E.D.N.Y.
1981) ("It is a fundamental rule of law in New York that a thief or someone who acquires
possession of stolen property after a theft cannot transfer a good title even to a bona fide
purchaser . . . ." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Candela v. Port Motors Inc., 617

N.Y.S.2d 49, 50 (App. Div. 1994) ("[I] f it is proven that [buyer] purchased the vehicle from
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good faith buyer from a merchant dealer who takes possession. 1 45 The
district court applied the well-recognized choice of law rule that the validity of a transfer of personal property is governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the property was located when it was transferred. 1 4 6 Unfortunately for the parties (and the court), the diamond trade relies on trust
among members of a homogeneous community and is marked by handshakes, relational contracting, and a notable absence of documentation. 14 7 Thus, the evidence failed clearly to indicate whether the transfer
of the diamond to Siyance occurred in Israel or New York. The court
resolved this conundrum by holding for Zarian, the original owner, on
the ground that even if Israeli sales law applied to the transaction, Siyance
could not carry its burden of good faith given the absence of documentaan actual car thief, or from the successor in interest to a car thief, then [buyer's] tide
would be void, and not merely 'voidable.'").
145. Section 34 of Israeli Sales Law states:
Where any movable property is sold by a person who carries on the sale of
property of the kind of the thing sold, and the sale is made in the ordinary course
of his business, ownership passes to the buyer free of every charge, attachment or
other right in the thing sold even if the seller is not the owner thereof or is not
entitled to transfer it as aforesaid, provided that the buyer buys and takes
possession of it in good faith.
Sale Law, 5728-1968, § 34 (Isr.), translated in I Business Laws of Israel, supra note 15, at
1.5-79, 1.5-85. For discussion of Market Overt in Israel, see generally Eyal Zamir, Market
Overt in the Sale of Goods: Israeli Law in a Comparative Perspective, 24 Isr. L. Rev. 82
(1990).
146. Zarian, 2006 WL 2239594, at *2 (citing Greek Orthodox Patriarchate v.
Christie's, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 7664 (KMW), 1999 WL 673347, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 1999);
Wertheimer v. Cirker's Hayes Storage Warehouse, Inc., No. 105575/00, 2001 WL 1657237,
at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 28, 2001)). In applying the law of the jurisdiction where the
property was located at the time of the transfer, the New York court in Zarianwas following
the widely recognized lex locus situs rule of private international law. This rule focuses on
the law of the transaction that led to the possession of the goods by the buyer, a transfer
that typically involves, as we have seen, a sale from a dealer to a bona fide purchaser. The
lex locus situs rule thus neglects the issues surrounding the rights of the original owner,
issues that are relevant in common law jurisdictions that retain the theft, voidable title, and
entrustment rules. In this way, the lex locus situs rule facilitates the laundering of stolen
goods by protecting transfers from intermediaries to good faith purchasers in jurisdictions
that follow Market Overt. See Winkworth v. Christie Manson & Woods Ltd., [1980] Ch. 496
at 501-02, 513-14 (Eng.) (discussing lex situs rule in English law and holding that Italian
law determined titled to goods stolen in England, sold in Italy, and later brought back into
England); Robin Morris Collin, The Law and Stolen Art, Artifacts, and Antiquities, 36
How. L.J. 17, 22-25 (1993) ("The lex locus situs rule permits the manipulation of stolen art
in such a way that the goods will obtain market value, resulting in substantial profits.").
147. For discussion of relational contracting in the diamond trade and its global
implications, see Barak D Richman, Ethnic Networks, Extra-legal Certainty and
Globalisation: Peering into the Diamond Industry, in Contractual Certainty in
International Trade: Empirical Studies and Theoretical Debates on Institutional Support
for Global Economic Exchanges 31 (Volkmar Gessner ed., 2009); Barak D. Richman,
Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of Private
Ordering, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 2328, 2351-54 (2004) (describing extralegal mechanisms for
ordering and sanctioning behavior within the diamond industry).
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tion,'1 4 8 although such informal trades are common in the diamond
industry.
It is difficult to rationalize the holding in Zarian on its own terms.
There was no evidence of bad faith by Siyance. All of the testimony supported the claim by Siyance that a sale and transfer of possession occurred in Israel. 149 Testimony of the merchant dealer who sold the diamond to Siyance's representative in Israel affirmed the custom in the
trade of exchanging diamonds with a simple note-a petek that is destroyed once the price is paid.1 5 0 The dealer's bona fides were confirmed
by his status as a Vice President of the Israeli Precious Stones and
Diamonds Exchange. 15 1 Lacking any specific evidence of bad faith, therefore, the only remaining inference is that the New York court determined
to preserve the rights of the original owner, which would have been available to him had the American theft rule applied.
Zarian shows that problems do not stem from the choice of law rules
themselves. The lex locus situs choice of law rule applied by the court is
facially neutral regarding the substantive rights of owners and buyers and
as between demand and refusal and discovery statutes of limitations. In
effect, however, the governing choice of law rules facilitate multibillion
dollar trafficking in stolen art, artifacts, and antiquities by permitting
wrongdoers to arbitrage between jurisdictions with different statutes of
limitations and between jurisdictions that follow the theft rule and those
that recognize Market Overt. Predictability in contests between owners
and buyers thus requires a harmonization of both the substantive and
procedural laws governing good faith purchase. A uniform approach to
good faith purchase would (1) reduce the demand for stolen goods; (2)
dampen socially wasteful efforts to launder those goods prior to their sale
to innocent purchasers; and (3) minimize wasteful conflicts of law litigation over which jurisdictions' substantive and procedural rules govern,
thereby reducing the incentives for forum shopping and wasteful
litigation.
VI. CONCLUSION

Laws addressing the good faith purchase problem have been around
for millennia, but as yet there is no consensus, either among jurisdictions
or among commentators, regarding an appropriate solution. Discord exists because the problem is unsolvable within the regnant property rights
paradigm. The law acts by assigning property rights to one or the other of
the parties: The owner always, sometimes, or never can recover her goods
from the ultimate purchaser; and the purchaser always, sometimes, or
never can keep them. Property right solutions fail for two reasons. First,
the owner will not take efficient precautions against theft or misappropri148.
149.
150.
151.

Zarian, 2006 WL 2239594, at *10.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. at *2.
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ation unless she loses stolen or misappropriated goods, while the buyer
will not take efficient precautions against buying tainted goods unless he
loses them to the owner. Neither party can be given the property right
always to lose or to keep the goods at issue. Second, the owner cannot be
given incentives to search for stolen or misappropriated goods unless she
recovers them when found; but if she recovers them when found, her
incentive to protect against theft falls.
When a problem has no obvious solution, contingent factors and
fairness concerns affect results. As examples, the American distinction between how the cases of stolen and misappropriated goods are regulated
probably results from an ineffective borrowing from English law in the
early nineteenth century. 152 The inefficient rule in some countries that
an owner can recover her goods from a good faith purchaser only if the
owner reimburses the price the purchaser paid probably stems from an
effort to treat the owner and buyer even handedly. Scholarly disagreement also stems partly from an inability to strongly defend any property
rights allocation.
Our contribution here is to argue for abandoning the property
rights paradigm in favor of a tort paradigm. We first show that the state
should choose commercial law rules that induce privately efficient behavior. Our solution, in turn, is more efficient than the property right solutions. Under it, an owner loses the goods if she invests a suboptimal level
of care in precaution or searches suboptimally for goods. A buyer always
loses the goods to a nonnegligent owner and always keeps them against a
negligent owner. The combination of negligence for owners and strict
liability for buyers improves the parties' incentives to protect against
theft, to search for stolen or misappropriated goods, and to investigate
title. Our solution, however, may founder over the difficulty courts may
have in evaluating the parties' behavior. Many of the facts relevant to a
negligence rule are hard for courts to recover.
We attempt to cope with this concern by translating to the good faith
purchase context a solution pursued in negotiable instruments law: to use
verifiable proxies that correlate with the existence or absence of negligent behavior. We argue that some such proxies exist today, and that
more would emerge were the law committed to a negligence solution.
Thus, abandoning commercial law for tort in the good faith purchase
context is a promising next step.
We also make a comparative law analysis of good faith purchase
rules. This analysis shows two things: The law is inefficient everywhere,
though in different ways; and the law's inefficiency causes socially unnecessary litigation, as parties shop for jurisdictions whose laws are favorable
in their particular cases. Our solution responds to these problems: Adopting it would improve a particular jurisdiction's laws, and adopting it everywhere would minimize the costs of diversity.
152. See supra note 16.
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APPENDIX
Country

Adopts nemo dat as base
principle?

Theft rule?

Voidable title?

USA

Yes.

Yes (see Solomon R.
Guggenheim Found. v.
Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426
(N.Y. 1991)).

Yes (U.C.C. § 2-403(1)
(2011)).

Brazil

Yes (C6digo Civil [C.C.]
arts. 1197, 1204, 1228
(Braz.) (Leslie Rose
trans., Renovar 2008)).

Yes, but if the object is
bought at a public
auction, fair or market,
the owner must pay the
price paid by the buyer
(C.C. art. 1268).

No (C.C. arts. 1267,
1268).

Canada

Qudbec:
Yes (Civil Code of
Quebec [C.C.Q.] art.
947 (Can.) (JeanMaurice Brisson &
Nicholas Kasirer trans.,
Editions Yvon Blais
2002)).

Qudbec: Yes (C.C.Q. arts.
953, 1713, 1714).

Quibec: No (C.C.Q. arts.
1713, 1714).

Ontario:
Yes (Sale of Goods Act
§ 22).

Ontario:
Yes (Sale of Goods Act
§ 24).

Ontario: Yes (Sale of
Goods Act, R.S.O. 1990,
c. S.1, § 22 (Can.)).

China

Yes (Xianxing Fagui
Huibian [Property Law]
art. 39 (China) (trans.
on file with the Columbia
Law Review)).

No, though the owner
has the right to
compensation from the
person who transferred
the goods to the good
faith purchaser
(Property Law art. 106).

Yes, but the owner can
recover them after
compensating the good
faith purchaser for the
expenses necessary to
maintain the goods
(Property Law arts. 241,
243).

Czech
Republic

Yes (Obtansk, zkonfk
[Civil Code] t. 123, 126,
134/2001 Sb. (Czech)
(Trade Links trans.,
2002)).

Yes (Civil Code t. 126).

Yes (Civil Code
t. 133(1)).
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Entrustment?

Market overt?

Statute of limitations?

Country

Yes (U.C.C. § 2-403(2)).

Never adopted.

Varies depending upon
jurisdiction; ranges from
"demand and refusal" to
"discovery" rule.

USA

No (C.C. arts. 1267,
1268).

Yes, if object bought at
public auction, etc. the
owner must compensate
good faith buyer for his
price; otherwise owner
only has to compensate
good faith purchaser for
necessary and useful
improvements to the
good (C.C. arts. 1219,
1268).

3 years of possession by
good faith purchaser
gives title; 5 years of
possession by any thirdparty, including thief,
gives title (C.C. arts.
1260, 1261).

Brazil

Quebec: No, but owner
must compensate good
faith purchaser (C.C.Q.
art. 1714).

Quebec: No, but owner
must compensate good
faith purchaser "in the
ordinary course of a
business enterprise"
(C.C.Q. arts. 953, 1713,
1714).

Quebec: 3 years (C.C.Q.
art. 2919).

Canada

Ontario:
Yes (Sale of Goods Act
§ 25).

Ontario: No
(Sale of Goods Act
§ 23).
Yes, but the owner can
recover from the good
faith purchaser as long
as he compensates them
for the good (Property
Law art. 107).

Yes, good faith
purchaser at an auction
or from a qualified
operator keeps goods
unless the owner
compensates the good
faith purchaser for the
price paid (Property
Law art. 107).

2 years, beginning from
when the owner knew
or ought to have known
the good was lost
(Property Law art. 107).

China

Yes (Civil Code t 612,
614(3)).

No, the owner only has
to compensate the good
faith purchaser for the
appreciation of the
good's value from the
time of loss to the time
of the return within
three years of the loss
(Civil Code t 130).

3 years from when the
right was asserted to the
good faith purchaser
(Civil Code e 102, 134).

Czech
Republic
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Theft rule?

Voidable title?

England

Yes (Sale of Goods Act,
(1979) § 21, 39(1) Hals.
Stat. (4th ed.) 395, 421
(Eng.)).

Yes (Sale of Goods Act
§ 21, 39(1) Hals. Stat. at
421).

Yes (Sale of Goods Act
§ 23, 39(1) Hals. Stat. at
422).

France

Yes (Code civil [C. civ.]
art. 711 (Fr.) (John H.
Crabb trans., Fred B.
Rothman & Co. 1995)).

Yes, but owner has to
compensate good faith
purchaser (C. civ.
arts. 2276, 2277, 2280).

Yes (C. civ. arts. 2276,
2277).

Germany

Yes (Bairgerliches
Gesetzbuch [BGB]
[Civil Code] § 929
(Ger.) (Langenscheidt
Translation Serv. trans.,
Fed. Ministry of Justice
2010)).

Yes, except when good
faith purchaser acquired
the good at an auction
(BGB § 935).

Yes, so long as the buyer
is in good faith and not
grossly negligent (BGB
§§ 932, 935).

India

Yes (see P. Ramanatha
Aiyar, The Sale of
Goods Act 112 (K.
Venkoba Rao & R.D.
Saxena eds., 3d ed.
1988) [Sale of Goods
Act] (reproducing § 27
of Indian Sale of Goods
Act as amended by Act
No. 33 of 1963)).

Yes (Sale of Goods Act
§ 27).

Yes, but the buyer must
act in good faith and
without notice of seller's
defect of tide (Sale of
Goods Act § 29).

Israel

Yes (Eyal Zamir, Market
Overt in the Sale of
Goods: Israeli Law in a
Comparative
Perspective, 24 Isr. L.
Rev. 82, 97 (1990)).

Yes, as long as good
faith purchaser acquired
the good from one
selling like merchandise
(Sale Law, 5728-1968,
§ 34 (Isr.), translated in
1 Business Laws of Israel
1.5-79, 1.5-85 (Louis
Garb et al. eds. & trans.,
12006)).

Yes (Pledges Law, 57271967, § 5 (Isr.),
translated in Israel's
Real Estate and Movable
Property Laws 79 (Aryeh
Greenfield, ed. & trans.,
1998).
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Entrustment?

Market overt?

Statute of limitations?

Yes (Factors Act, (1889)
§ 2(1), vol. 1 Hals. Stat.
(4th ed. 2004) 58, 59
(Eng.)).

Repealed in 1995 (Sale
of Goods (Amendment)
Act, (1994) § 1, vol.
39(1) Hals. Stat. (4th
ed. 2008) 681, 681
(Eng.)).

None (Factors Act § 12,
Hals. Stat. at 65).

England

Yes (C. civ. art. 2277).

Yes, good faith
purchaser gets to keep
goods unless owner
compensates him (C.
civ. arts. 2277, 2280).
Yes, if the good faith
purchaser acquired the
good at an auction
(BGB § 935).

3 years from when the
good was lost or stolen
(C. civ. art. 2279).

France

None.

Germany

Yes, mercantile agent in
possession with owner's
consent can pass good
title to good faith buyer
(Sale of Goods Act
§ 27).

No.

None.

India

Yes (Sale Law § 34).

Yes, if goods are sold by
merchant dealer in
ordinary course of
business, ownership
passes to good faith
buyer who takes
possession (Sale Law
§ 34).

None.

Israel

Yes (BGB §§ 932, 935).

Country
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Italy

Yes (Codice civile [C.c.]
art. 832 (It.) (Mario
Beltramo et al. trans.,
Oceana 2010)).

Yes, but the Code
Yes (C.c. art. 1153).
provides only for actions
against the taker, not
against the good faith
purchaser (C.c. arts.
834, 1161).

Japan

Yes (Minpo [Minpo]
[Civ. C.] arts. 179, 206
(Japan) (Ministry of
Justice trans., 2009)).

Yes, but if good faith
purchaser bought stolen
good at an auction or at
a public market or from
a seller dealing in
similar goods, owner
must compensate good
faith purchaser for it
(Civ. C. art. 194).

Yes (Civ. C. arts. 188,
194, 204).

Mexico

Yes (C6digo Civil
Federal [CC] arts. 798,
830 (Mex.) (Julio
Romanach, Jr. trans.,
Lawrence Publ'g Co.
2002)).

Yes, unless the good
faith purchaser acquired
the goods at an auction
(CC art. 799).

No (CC art. 798).

Portugal

Yes.

Yes (Civil Code art. 892
(Port.) (trans. on file
with the Columbia Law
Review)).

No, but owner must
compensate good faith
purchaser (Civil Code
art. 894).

Russia

Yes (Grazhdanskii
Kodeks Rossiiskoi
Federatsii [GK RF]
[Civil Code] art. 209
(Russ.) (William E.
Butler trans., Wildy,
Simmonds & Hill Publ'g
2010)).

Yes (GK RF art. 302(1)).

Yes (GK RF arts. 218,
223, 224).

Spain

Yes (C6digo Civil [C.C.]
art. 348 (Spain) (Julio
Romanach, Jr. trans.,
Lawrence Publ'g Co.
1994)).

Yes, but owner has to
compensate good faith
purchaser if they bought
it at a public sale (C.C.
art. 464).

No (C.C. arts. 436, 447,
463, 464).

Switzerland

Yes (Code Civil [CC]
arts. 641, 715 (Switz.)
(Rebecca BrunnerPeters et al. trans.,
Schulthess 2007)).

Yes, but the owner must
compensate good faith
purchaser (CC arts. 641,
934).

Yes (CC art. 717).
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Entrustment?

Market overt?

Statute of limitations?

Country

Yes (C.c. art. 1153).

Yes (C.c. arts. 1153,
1159).

1 year from the
discovery of the taking
of the good, as against
the taker (C.c. art.
1168); 10 years for good
faith purchaser before
they are considered to
have assumed ownership
(C.c. art. 1161).

Italy

Yes (Civ. C. arts. 194,
204).

Yes, unless owner
compensates good faith
purchaser for the good
(Civ. C. art. 194).

2 years from when the
good was stolen or lost
(Civ. C. art. 193).

Japan

Yes, but owner has right
of action against seller
(CC art. 799).

Yes, unless owner
reimburses the good
faith purchaser (CC art.
799).

3 years, or 5 years if
good faith is not
established (CC art.
1153).

Mexico

No, but owner has to
compensate good faith
purchaser (Civil Code
art. 1301).

No (Civil Code art.
892).

4 years from original
misappropriation or
theft (Civil Code art.
1300).

Portugal

Yes (GK RF arts. 218,
223, 224).

No, owner can reclaim a 3 years from when the
good acquired by good
owner knew or should
faith purchaser when
have known about the
the goods were either
violation of his rights in
lost by the owner or the the goods; but good
goods were stolen, or
faith purchaser gets
left the possession of
ownership rights after 5
the owner contrary to
years of uninterrupted
their will (GK RF art.
possession of the goods
302).
(GK RF arts. 196, 200,

No (C.C. arts. 436, 447,
463, 464).

Yes, good faith
purchaser gets to keep
goods if he bought
them at a sale, unless
owner compensates him

Russia

234).

3 years (C.C. arts. 1955,
1962).

Spain

5 years from when the
good was lost or stolen
(CC arts. 722, 728, 729,
934).

Switzerland

(C.C. art. 464).

Yes (CC art. 717).

August 2011

Yes, unless owner
reimburses the price
paid by the good faith
purchaser (CC art. 934).
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